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SUMMARY 
Researchers at Cardiff University held a one day roundtable event on Transparency in the Court of Protection 
as part of a wider Nuffield Foundation funded project on welfare cases in the Court of Protection (CoP).   The 
aim of the project is to gather high quality information to contribute to policy debates about transparency, 
efficiency and accessibility in the Court of Protection, and proposals for reform.   
This report describes the discussions at a roundtable on the theme of Transparency in the Court of 
Protection. 1  It was held in September 2014 at the Nuffield Foundation headquarters, and was attended by 
participants from a range of backgrounds, including members of the judiciary, lawyers with experience of 
acting for litigants in CoP welfare cases, media lawyers, journalists and other professionals working in media, 
civil servants and researchers. 
Proceedings in the Court of Protection involve a delicate balance between transparency and open justice, on 
the one hand, and the preservation of the right to respect for privacy for the intimate details of the life of 
the person who is alleged to lack capacity. All participants expressed support for the principle of ‘open 
justice’.  Media reporting on CoP cases, and the publication of judgments, were said to be important for the 
following reasons: 
- To enhance public understanding of the CoP's work; 
- To protect against miscarriages of justice; 
- To promote public confidence in the court; 
- ‘Open’ and ‘accessible’ judgments were said to be important for access to justice for litigants in 
person who might not have access to law reports or legal advice. 
It was also suggested that media reporting could include facts and details which were not apparent in a 
published judgment but which might aid public understanding of a case, whilst published judgments were 
important as a corrective against poor or inaccurate journalism. 
Whilst all participants broadly supported the principle of ‘transparency’, there was some disagreement 
about what this entailed in practice.  Some participants highlighted the limited evidence base for claims that 
transparency protected against miscarriages of justice.  There was concern about the potential harm to 
individuals about facts from their private lives being in the public domain, including the distress which could 
arise from reading published reports about one’s own case – even if this did not result in further harms.  
Lawyers with experience of CoP litigation warned that even with ‘watertight’ reporting restrictions, 
anonymity could not always be guaranteed, commenting that although transparency was important ‘there is 
a price to be paid’. 
There was unanimous agreement that there were some serious shortcomings with current arrangements for 
media access and reporting on CoP cases.  In particular, representatives of the media argued that the need 
to apply formally to attend a hearing was costly, and could have a chilling effect on reporting CoP cases – 
this would have a disproportionate impact on smaller media organisations.  All participants felt that 
arrangements in the CoP for media attendance at health and welfare cases should be brought in line with 
the family courts, where the media do not need to make an application to attend private hearings, but the 
court has powers to exclude them on specific grounds and restrict the publication of information.   
A significant area of concern was how the media could, or should, be informed about important cases.  
There was disagreement among the participants about whether it is lawful for a party, or their lawyer, to 
alert the media to an important case; there is an urgent need for clarity on this issue.  Some participants felt 
                                                          
1 A second roundtable has subsequently been held on 20 March 2015, again at Nuffield Foundation headquarters on 
The Participation of the Relevant Person in Welfare Cases in the Court of Protection. The relevant person is the 
allegedly incapacitated person, who is the subject of the proceedings... 
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that the court listings should be more informative, so that the media could see which cases might be 
important in order to send a journalist to attend the hearing.  There were also concerns about the 
procedures for notifying the media about reporting restrictions. 
On the basis of discussions at the roundtable, we have identified the following issues for further exploration: 
1. Consideration should be given to whether the court should adopt a rule change to permit the media 
to attend important welfare hearings, as well as serious medical treatment cases, without making an 
application first - mirroring the practice in the Family Court; 
2. Consideration should be given to improving the system for informing the media of important CoP 
cases; 
3. There is a need for greater legal clarity about when parties and legal representatives can lawfully 
inform the media about a case; 
4. Practice Direction 13A may need to be updated to remind the parties of the need to notify the 
media of any order imposing reporting restrictions, in addition to notifying them of any application 
for reporting restrictions; 
5. The court, or researchers, should explore ways to collect statistics on how effectively the 
transparency guidance on the publication of judgments is being complied with: how many 
judgments meeting the criteria for publication under the new guidance are, and are not, being 
published? 
6. More research is needed on: the views of litigants about media reporting on CoP cases and the 
publication of judgments; the users of published judgments and their information and access needs; 
the effect of ‘transparency’ on the behaviour of the judiciary and other actors within the legal 
system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report describes discussions at a roundtable on transparency in the Court of Protection held on 19 
September 2014, convened by researchers at the Centre for Health and Social Care Law at Cardiff 
University.3 The roundtable is part of a research project on Welfare Cases in the Court of Protection4 which is 
funded by the Nuffield Foundation5. The aim of the project is to gather high quality information to 
contribute to policy debates about transparency, efficiency and accessibility in the Court of Protection, and 
proposals for reform.  
The study comprises several strands of research, including a systematic quantitative analysis of court files, 
and gathering qualitative data from a range of stakeholders using focus groups, surveys and interviews.  The 
researchers have also used roundtables to explore specific policy issues with experts.  This was the first 
roundtable. 6  It was attended by participants from a range of backgrounds, including members of the 
judiciary, lawyers with experience of acting for litigants in CoP welfare cases, media lawyers, journalists and 
other professionals working in media, civil servants and researchers.   
The Court of Protection (CoP) is a new court established under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). It was 
created to adjudicate on a range of matters relating to mental capacity, best interests and legal powers and 
instruments created by the MCA such as advance decisions refusing treatment7 and Lasting Powers of 
Attorney8.  Since 2009 the CoP has also had powers to make determinations regarding authorisations issued 
by supervisory bodies9 under the deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS)10. A person who lacks capacity, or 
is believed to lack capacity, is referred to in the MCA as ‘P’. The CoP has a range of powers, including 
jurisdiction to make declarations regarding P’s mental capacity and best interests, to make orders relating to 
P’s welfare or property and affairs, and to appoint a deputy to make decisions about welfare or property and 
affairs on P’s behalf.  
                                                          
3 http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/chscl/ 
4 More information is available on the project website: http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wccop 
5 The Nuffield Foundation is an endowed charitable trust that aims to improve social well-being in the widest sense. It 
funds research and innovation in education and social policy and also works to build capacity in education, science and 
social science research. The Nuffield Foundation has funded this project, but the views expressed are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the Foundation. More information is available on the Nuffield Foundation website: 
www.nuffieldfoundation.org 
6 A second roundtable has subsequently been held on 20 March 2015, again at Nuffield Foundation headquarters on 
The Participation of the Relevant Person in Welfare Cases in the Court of Protection. The relevant person is the 
allegedly incapacitated person), who is the subject of the proceedings. 
7 These are legal instruments which allow a person who has mental capacity to specify circumstances in which they 
would like to refuse specific treatments, in the event that they did not have the mental capacity to refuse that 
treatment at the requisite time.  See sections 24-26 MCA. 
8 Lasting Powers of Attorney (LPA) allow a person who has mental capacity to specify named individuals who they 
would like to make decisions about either property and affairs, or health and welfare, matters in the event that they 
lost mental capacity (or immediately, in the case of property and affairs LPAs). 
9 In England, local authorities are supervisory bodies for the DoLS.  In Wales, local authorities are supervisory bodies 
where any deprivation of liberty occurs in a care home, and Local Health Boards are the supervisory body for any 
deprivation of liberty in hospitals. 
10 See Schedule A1 of the MCA and the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards Code of Practice, 
(Lord Chancellor's Office, TSO, London 2008). 
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The vast majority of the court’s work is non-contentious property and affairs matters. At present,11 health 
and welfare matters form only a small proportion of applications and orders.12  Yet, due to their socially and 
politically sensitive nature, and because they often involve disputes between professionals and families, 
health and welfare cases tend to have a much higher profile in academic and media commentaries on the 
court’s work. 
Since the court was established in 2007, the media have reported on a number of CoP cases, including cases 
on contraception,13 abortion and sterilisation14, sex15, end of life decisions,16 the DoLS17, and contact with 
family members18. Various media commentators have voiced concerns about the court’s work, including 
perceived ‘secrecy’ in the court’s operations19, people being ‘jailed in secret’,20 the cost of proceedings21, 
‘out of hours’ rulings22 as well as concern about the merits of welfare decisions taken by the court. Several 
senior judges have spoken publicly about the importance of transparency, including its former President, Sir 
                                                          
11 This may change as a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council and another; P 
and Q v Surrey County Council [2014] UKSC 19, which means that many more people may now be considered to be 
deprived of their liberty in a care setting.  Because the DoLS only apply in care homes and hospitals, those who are 
deprived of their liberty in other settings will require a court authorisation to provide legal safeguards.  It is estimated 
that this may mean as many as 31,000 more applications to the CoP relating to deprivation of liberty, more than 
doubling the current overall number of applications (see n12). 
12 In 2013, the CoP received 24,923 applications in total, but only 166 of these related to ‘one off’ welfare decisions and 
333 related to welfare deputyships. For further statistics on applications received and orders made by the COP between 
2008-2013 see: Ministry of Justice (2014) Court Statistics Quarterly January to March 2014, London. Please note, 
however, that these data may not accurately reflect all the welfare matters determined by the Court of Protection. 
Official statistics from the Office of the Official Solicitor reports a much higher number of CoP welfare cases: Office of 
the Official Solicitor and the Public Trustee (2013) The Official Solicitor and the Public Trustee: Annual Report 1 April 
2012 – 31 March 2013, London. 
13 Beckford, M. (2010) 'Judge criticises council for trying to force contraception on woman', The Telegraph, 18 August 
2010. 
14 Beckford, M. (2010) 'Secret Court of Protection can order abortions and sterilisations of mentally ill patients', The 
Telegraph, 28 May 2010. 
15 Beckford, M. (2011) 'Court bans man with low IQ from having sex', The Telegraph, 04 February 2011. 
16 Jones, N. (2011) 'When "right to die" really means "right to kill" ', New Statesman, 19 July 2011. 
17 McSmith, A. (2011) 'A father and son reunited. A secret court forced to open its doors', The Independent, 01 March 
2011. 
18 Cassidy, S. (2012) 'Foster parents told to stay away from 'autistic' man', The Independent, 11 February 2012. 
19 There are many examples of this, see, for example, this editorial: 'Comment: Who stands to gain from secret justice?', 
(2013) Daily Mail, 03 December 2013. 
20 Doughty, S. and Dolan, A. (2013) 'Jailed in secret - for trying to rescue her father from care home where she believed 
he would die', Daily Mail, 23 April 2013. 
21 Dugan, E. (2013) 'Six years, three judges, £350,000 in costs to the taxpayer... and no change: Judge hits out at 
'astonishing' cost of Court of Protection case', The Independent, 11 October 2013. 
22 'Out-of-hours rulings are an affront to justice: Crucial decisions are being made on the basis of the testimony of only 
one' (2013) The Independent, 23 June 2013. 
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Nicholas Wall23, the current President Sir James Munby24, the Vice President, Mr Justice Charles25, retired 
judge Sir Mark Hedley26, and Lord Neuberger, the President of the Supreme Court27. Alastair Pitblado – the 
Official Solicitor - who acts as a ‘litigation friend’ of last resort for people who lack the capacity to litigate has 
also expressed support for more transparency in the court.28 Examples of specific cases that have attracted 
media interest are described in Appendix 2, below. 
‘Transparency’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘openness’,29 and concerns about transparency might be 
addressed by different means than complete openness.   In the context of the CoP it has commonly been 
used to refer to whether or not proceedings are heard in public, whether the media may attend and report 
upon proceedings heard in private, whether judgments are published, and whether the parties to the case 
and witnesses giving evidence may be identified.  
Transparency can also relate to wider concerns regarding the sharing of information about proceedings by 
the parties themselves – for example whether people may share information with their MP if they are 
seeking their assistance, their employer – if they need to take time off work for a case, with professionals 
such as counsellors if a person needs support about a case, and so on. ‘Transparency’ issues also arise for 
researchers, for example if they wish to carry out research on litigants’ experience of the CoP, which 
therefore would require them to talk to litigants about proceedings heard in private or access court 
documents. 
TRANSPARENCY: THE WIDER CONTEXT 
Questions regarding the ‘transparency’ of the CoP arise in a wider context of growing public concern about 
transparency in the courts as a whole, indeed about government in general.30 Public concern about the 
abuse of ‘privacy’ reached fever pitch in 2011 following the use of ‘super injunctions’ by the multinational 
corporation Trafigura31 and by celebrities to restrict reporting not only of material that they sought to keep 
secret, but also of the fact an injunction had been sought to suppress its publication.32 It is important to 
distinguish between the cases involving the secrecy of corporate activities and those involving individual 
privacy.33  ‘Transparency’ concerns have also been raised about the use of closed material procedures under 
                                                          
23 Hill, A. (2011) 'Court of protection should be open to public scrutiny, says leading judge', The Guardian, 06 November 
2011. 
24 Doyle, J. (2013) 'Cloak of secrecy to be lifted from family court', Daily Mail, 23 July 2013. 
25 Dugan, E. (2013) 'Top judge calls for more Court of Protection cases to be made public', The Independent, 19 
September 2013. 
26 Dugan, E. (2013) 'Sir Mark Hedley: The judge who opened the doors to Britain’s most secretive court', The 
Independent, 16 June 2013. 
27 Doyle, J. (2013) ''I welcome increased openness unreservedly': Supreme Court judge's praise for Mail's open justice 
fight', Daily Mail, 03 October 2013. 
28 Gibb, F. (2011) ''It is right that the public understands what the court does, the why and the how'; Alastair Pitblado, 
the Official Solicitor, has had a low profile but his work is starting to hit the headlines', The Times, 03 March 2011. 
29 Birkinshaw, P.J. (2006) ‘Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human Rights?’ Administrative Law 
Review 58, 177-218 
30 Cabinet Office (2011) Making Open Data Real: A Public Consultation. London; Committee of Public Accounts (2012) 
Implementing the transparency agenda, (House of Commons, Tenth Report of Session 2012–13, London). 
31 To prohibit reporting of a toxic waste dumping scandal in the Côte d'Ivoire. 
32 Lord Neuberger (2011) Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions: Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and 
Open Justice, London: Master of the Rolls. 
33 Bok, S. (1984) Secrecy: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation  OUP 
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anti-terror legislation and, latterly, civil proceedings.34  These concerns have led to a diverse array of media 
organisations – including the Daily Mail, the Independent, the Guardian, the Telegraph and the Times – 
leading campaigns on ‘secret courts’ and the use of privacy injunctions, whilst NGOs such as Liberty and 
JUSTICE have also campaigned on issues such as closed material procedures. 
A desire for ‘transparency’ about the workings of the law has also prompted growing demands for legal 
materials to be freely accessible to citizens, instead of being locked away in expensive law reports and 
subscription only databases.35 Free public access to judgments on websites such as the British and Irish Legal 
Information Institute (BAILII)36 is seen as an essential component of modern justice.37 The UK Supreme Court 
has been praised as an exemplary model of ‘open justice’, with live streamed hearings, and judgments 
summaries posted on its website.38 The advent of social media has seen lawyers blogging and tweeting 
about the law – offering plain English summaries of cases alongside comment and critical analysis; even the 
UK Supreme Court now has a Twitter account.39 In response to journalists and bloggers wanting to ‘live 
tweet’ or ‘live blog’ from hearings, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales has issued guidance on 
tweeting in court.40 The dawn of social media has allowed information to be disseminated rapidly, widely, 
often anonymously, and without the filter of publishers and editors; the law has had to catch up.  
As a result of various high profile cases involving contempt of court for the publication of information about 
court proceedings or police investigations, the Law Commission embarked upon a public consultation about 
‘the challenge that is posed by the new media to the existing laws on contempt of court which pre-date the 
internet age’.41  The Commission has made recommendations relating to the publication of information 
about proceedings on social media42, and reporting restrictions ordering the postponement of contemporary 
court reporting in criminal proceedings.43 The project considered the courts in general and made no specific 
reference to the Court of Protection. 
A close analogy to calls for greater transparency in the CoP can be drawn with longstanding and increasing 
demands for greater ‘transparency’ in the family courts,44 particularly from the media, but also from 
                                                          
34 Ip, J. (2012) 'Al Rawi, Tariq, and the Future of Closed Material Procedures and Special Advocates', The Modern Law 
Review, 75(4), 606-623; Phillips, N. (2014) 'Closed Material', London Review of Books, 17 April 2014. 
35 Albon, E. (2012) The free legal info landscape, translated by Centre for Law, Justice and Journalism, City University, 
London; Holmes, N. (2012) Accessible justice, translated by Centre for Law, Justice and Journalism, City University, 
London. 
36 www.bailii.org 
37 Lord Neuberger (2012) 'No Judgment – No Justice', in The First Annual BAILII Lecture, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
LLP, Fleet Street, London, 21 November 2012; Lord Neuberger (2013) 'Justice in an Age of Austerity', in Justice - Tom 
Sargant Memorial Lecture, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, London, 15 October 2013. 
38 Wagner, A. (2013) 'The supreme court's YouTube channel is a welcome step for open justice', The Guardian, 21 
January 2013. 
39 www.twitter.com/UKSupremeCourt 
40 Lord Judge (2011) Practice Guidance: The use of live text-based forms of communication (including Twitter) from 
court for the purposes of fair and accurate reporting. The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. 
41 Law Commission (2012) Contempt of Court: A Consultation Paper, (Consultation Paper No 209) London. Paragraph 1.2 
42 Law Commission (2013) Contempt of Court (1): Juror misconduct and internet publications, (Law Com No 340, HC 860) 
London. 
43 Law Commission (2014) Contempt of Court (2): Court Reporting, (Law Com No 344) London. 
44 Wright, M. (1992) 'The Press, Children and Injunctions', The Modern Law Review, 55(6), 857-865. 
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members of the judiciary themselves.45 The family courts have seen successive waves of consultation and 
reform in the area of transparency since the 1990s.46 A recent pilot project carried out a trial of the 
feasibility and desirability of routinely placing anonymised judgments from certain categories of family cases 
online.47 However, there are indications that children and young people themselves may not welcome these 
developments in transparency.48 
The President of the Family Division and the Court of Protection – Sir James Munby – is a consistent 
advocate of greater ‘transparency’ in court proceedings. In an address to the Family Law Bar Association he 
stated that transparency was a central element of his vision for reform of the family courts: 
I am determined to take steps to improve access to and reporting of family proceedings. I 
am determined that the new Family Court should not be saddled, as the family courts are at 
present, with the charge that we are a system of secret and unaccountable justice. Work, 
commenced by my predecessor, is well underway. I hope to be in a position to make 
important announcements in the near future.49 
Sir James Munby has also stated that issues of transparency in the family courts apply just as much to the 
CoP50, and has expressed a desire to harmonise the approach of each court as far as possible in this 
respect.51 There are some important differences in the legal regulation of privacy and transparency issues in 
the CoP and family proceedings – not least that the CoP has no equivalent to section 97 of the Children Act 
1989, which makes it a criminal offence to publish any material that is likely to identify a child who is the 
subject of family court proceedings. However, like the family courts, publication of information about 
proceedings in the CoP is governed by section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 and the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981, which are discussed in more detail below.   It also tends to hear cases in private.   
                                                          
45 Mr Justice Munby (2005) 'Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings', paper presented at Jordan's Family Law 
Conference, London, on 1 December 2005. 
46 Lord Chancellor's Department (1993) Review of Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings, London; Select 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs (2005) Family Justice: The operation of family courts. Volume 1, (HC 116-I) House of 
Commons, London; Department for Constitutional Affairs (2005) Disclosure of Information in Family Proceedings Cases 
Involving Children: Response to the public consultation, (Cm 6623) London; Department for Constitutional Affairs  
(2007) Confidence and confidentiality: Improving transparency and privacy in family courts. Response to Consultation, 
(CP(R) 11/06; Cm 7036) Department for Constitutional Affairs and Her Majesty's Courts Service; Ministry of Justice 
(2007) Confidence and Confidentiality: Openness in family courts – a new approach, (Cm 7131) London; Ministry of 
Justice (2008) Family Justice in View: Response to consultation, (CP(R) 10/07) London. 
47 Ministry of Justice (2011) The Family Courts Information Pilot: November 2009- December 2010 London. 
48 Ministry of Justice (2007) Confidence and Confidentiality: Openness in family courts – a new approach, (Cm 7131) 
London; Brophy, J. (2010) The views of children and young people regarding media access to family courts, The 
Children’s Commissioner for England, London; Brophy, J., Perry, K., Prescott, A. and Renouf, C. (2014) Safeguarding, 
Privacy and Respect for Children and Young People: The Next Steps in Media Access to Family Courts, National Youth 
Advocacy Service and Association of Lawyers for Children. 
49 Sir James Munby (2013) 'Address by the President', paper presented at Annual Dinner of the Family Law Bar 
Association, Middle Temple Hall, London, on 22 February 2013. 
50 Sir James Munby (2013) 'Opening up the Family Courts: Transparency in the Family Court and the Court of 
Protection', paper presented at Annual Conference of the Society of Editors 'Freedom to Inform' London, on 11 
November 2013. 
51 Judiciary of England and Wales (2014) Transparency in the Court of Protection. Publication of judgments, Practice 
Guidance issued on 16 January 2014 by Sir James Munby, President of the Court of Protection, London. 
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Following reforms in the family courts in 200952, accredited journalists have a right to attend most hearings 
unless narrowly defined grounds for excluding them can be established,53 whereas in the CoP, the media 
must seek permission to attend court. The President has stated his intention to align the practice of the CoP 
in this respect.54 In his first year as President, Sir James Munby issued practice guidance relating to 
‘transparency’ in the area of committals and the publication of judgments, and announced further possible 
reforms for both the family courts and the CoP. These are discussed below. 
Concerns about transparency in the CoP have a very high profile in the media. Alongside this there are also 
growing concerns about the culture, ethics and practices of the media regarding privacy.55 Appendix 2 
summarises key CoP cases concerning transparency. These cases reveal very variable reporting of CoP 
proceedings by the mainstream media. There are many examples of accurate and responsible media 
reporting of CoP cases, and on many occasions – perhaps most notably the cases of Steven Neary and ‘RGS’- 
journalists have been praised by judges for their coverage and approach. It seems likely that publicity in the 
Neary case, which concerned a young man who was unlawfully deprived of his liberty in a care home, has 
also been a factor behind growing awareness of the need to refer welfare disputes to court. Yet there are 
also examples of highly inaccurate reporting of cases, of which the case of Alessandra Pacchieri – an Italian 
woman who underwent a caesarean operation against her will, after an order of the Court of Protection - is 
one of the most prominent examples. 
In contrast to the family courts, there is as yet no empirical research on the views of litigants in the CoP 
about ‘transparency’ issues such as media attendance and reporting, and the publication of judgments. The 
cases summarised in Appendix 2 and described in this report reveal a diversity of views on media attendance 
and reporting of proceedings. In some cases families have been so frightened of being ‘doorstepped’ by the 
media during what are already extremely distressing proceedings, there are concerns that they may be 
prevented from accessing justice at all. In other cases, families have gone to the media to express outrage 
and a sense of injustice at what has happened to them in court and in doing so have risked proceedings for 
contempt of court.  Other families wish to speak to the media to tell them about an injustice that the court 
has helped to set right.  Some people are not told about media coverage of their own case because it could 
upset them, and in some cases the publication of a judgment has been delayed because the person the case 
is about was not to be notified about the proceedings. There are accounts of the court choosing to identify 
individuals and public authorities whose behaviour has been less than exemplary, and conversely where 
their conduct has been praised by the court in order that they can publicly rebut criticism. There are also 
accounts of people who are themselves the subject of CoP proceedings, who have actively sought the 
involvement of the media as a political act to draw attention to the predicament of older people in our 
society, but in some cases there is also concern that this might have been a result of undue influence 
exercised by others. How can we frame the law to best accommodate these diverse situations? 
This report describes discussions at the roundtable on transparency in the CoP, which brought together 
people from a range of backgrounds – including those working within the court system, those who use it and 
those whose work involves reporting on or researching it.  It also describes the law relating to ‘transparency’ 
and privacy in the Court of Protection, including key cases, and makes recommendations regarding specific 
issues raised by roundtable participants as requiring further exploration. 
                                                          
52 Ministry of Justice (2009) Practice Direction 27B, Attendance of Media Representatives at Hearings in Family 
Proceedings. 
53 Family Procedure Rules 2010, rule 27.11 
54 Sir James Munby (2013) 'Opening up the Family Courts: Transparency in the Family Court and the Court of 
Protection', paper presented at Annual Conference of the Society of Editors 'Freedom to Inform' London, on 11 
November 2013. 
55 Lord Justice Leveson (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Executive Summary, London. 
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This section contains a detailed description of the legal framework governing transparency in the Court of 
Protection.56  It discusses the ‘automatic restraints’ on publishing information under section 12 of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1960 and what ‘publication’ means in this context, the Contempt of Court Act 
1981, the Court of Protection Rules which govern who may attend hearings and what may be reported, 
human rights and common law principles that apply to transparency and privacy issues in the Court of 
Protection, and recent guidance on transparency produced by the President of the Court of Protection.   
We have also included some case studies to illustrate how the CoP has applied the law and developed 
important principles, but these are described in more detail in Appendix 2 below.  We have also provided a 
short summary of the basic principles of the law governing transparency and privacy in the CoP in Appendix 
1. 
SECTION 12 OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ACT 1960 
Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (AJA)57 restricted those situations where courts might 
find that a person was in contempt of court for reporting proceedings.  It applies to cases brought under the 
                                                          
56 We also provided this information as a background briefing for participants at the roundtable. 
57 The complete text of s12 AJA (as amended) reads: 
(1) The publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be 
contempt of court except in the following cases, that is to say— 
(a) where the proceedings— 
(i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors; 
(ii) are brought under the Children Act 1989 or the Adoption and Children Act 2002; or 
(iii) otherwise relate wholly or mainly to the maintenance or upbringing of a minor; 
(b) where the proceedings are brought under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, or under any provision of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 authorising an application or reference to be made to the First-tier Tribunal, the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales or a county court the county court; 
(c) where the court sits in private for reasons of national security during that part of the proceedings about 
which the information in question is published; 
(d) where the information relates to a secret process, discovery or invention which is in issue in the 
proceedings; 
(e) where the court (having power to do so) expressly prohibits the publication of all information relating to 
the proceedings or of information of the description which is published. 
(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, the publication of the text or a summary of the whole or part of an 
order made by a court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except where the court (having power to 
do so) expressly prohibits the publication. 
(3) In this section references to a court include references to a judge and to a tribunal and to any person exercising the 
functions of a court, a judge or a tribunal; and references to a court sitting in private include references to a court 
sitting in camera or in chambers. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as implying that any publication is punishable as contempt of court which 
would not be so punishable apart from this section (and in particular where the publication is not so punishable by 
reason of being authorised by rules of court). 
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MCA, before the Mental Health Tribunals (discussed below) and also in certain family proceedings relating to 
children.  The publication of information regarding the specified cases under s12 AJA is not automatically a 
contempt, rather it may be a contempt if the publisher has the requisite mens rea.58 
The automatic restrictions in s12 AJA do not apply to CoP proceedings heard in public, nor to proceedings 
under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court,59 nor to proceedings which may involve the MCA but which 
were not brought under the MCA.60 
What information is restricted under s12 AJA? 
Munby J (as he then was) considered the nature of the 
information that is restricted from publication by s12 AJA in 
Re B (A Child)61 (right). He found that s12 AJA does prohibit 
the publication of: 
a) accounts of what has gone on in front of the 
judge sitting in private; 
b) documents such as affidavits, witness 
statements, reports, position statements, 
skeleton arguments or other documents filed in 
the proceedings, transcripts or notes of the 
evidence or submissions, and transcripts or notes 
of the judgment (this list is not necessarily 
exhaustive); 
c) extracts or quotations from such documents; 
d) summaries of such documents. 62 
Perhaps surprisingly, he found that s12 AJA does not prohibit 
the publication of identifying information, including: 
a) the fact, if it be the case, that a child is a ward of 
court and is the subject of wardship proceedings or 
that a child is the subject of residence or other 
proceedings under the Children Act 1989 or of 
proceedings relating wholly or mainly to his 
maintenance or upbringing; 
b) the name, address or photograph of such a child; 
c) the name, address or photograph of the parties (or, if 
the child is a party, the other parties) to such 
proceedings; 
d) the date, time or place of a past or future hearing of such proceedings; 
                                                          
(5) Subsection (1) is subject to Part 2 of the Children, Schools and Families Act 2010 (family proceedings), and nothing in 
subsection (2) applies in relation to a contempt of court under section 11 of that Act (restriction on publication of 
information relating to family proceedings). 
58 Re F (a minor) (publication of information) [1977] 1 All ER 114 (Court of Appeal); see also Wookey v Wookey [1991] 
Fam 121 and P v P (Contempt of Court: Mental Capacity) [1999] 2 FLR 892. 
59 RB (Adult) (No 4) [2011] EWHC 3017 (Fam) 
60 For example, proceedings in the Administrative Court or the Queen’s Bench (e.g. ZH v The Commissioner of Police for 
the Metropolis [2012] EWHC 604 (QB)) 
61 [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam); see also X v Dempster [1999] 3 FCR 757 
62 Re B (A Child), paragraph 82 
Re B (A Child) 
The events in Re B took place in the context 
of a Government review of care proceedings 
where findings had been based solely on 
medical evidence, following controversy 
about criminal convictions based on expert 
evidence later found to be unreliable. Sarah 
Harman was a solicitor acting for a mother 
who wanted to appeal against findings that 
had led to care orders being made; the 
findings included suspected factitious illness 
(Munchausen’s syndrome by proxy). The 
mother was anxious to refer her case to the 
review, and passed some court papers to 
MPs and journalists. Sarah Harman also 
passed papers to her sister, Harriet Harman 
MP, who was then Solicitor General and to 
Margaret Hodge MP, whose department was 
conducting the review. These actions all took 
place without any application to the court 
for leave. Munby J subsequently found both 
the mother and the solicitor to be in 
contempt under s 12 Administration of 
Justice Act 1960. 
 
 14 
 
e) the nature of the dispute in such proceedings; 
f) anything which has been seen or heard by a person conducting himself lawfully in the public corridor 
or other public precincts outside the court in which the hearing in private is taking place; 
g) the name, address or photograph of the witnesses who have given evidence in such proceedings; 
h) the party on whose behalf such a witness has given evidence; and 
i) the text or summary of the whole or part of any order made in such proceedings.63 
Unlike proceedings under the Children Act 198964, therefore, there are no automatic restrictions on 
identifying the subject of proceedings before the CoP.  In this respect, the current framework for the 
publication of information in the CoP offers weaker protection of privacy than proceedings concerning 
children.  However, restrictions on the publication of identifying information may be imposed by court order 
under the Court of Protection Rules 2007, or by the Contempt of Court Act 1981 – see below. 
What is meant by ‘publication’ under s12 AJA? 
In Re B Munby J also considered what is meant by ‘publication’ under s12 AJA. He concluded that ‘There is a 
"publication" for this purpose whenever the law of defamation would treat there as being a publication’, 
including oral and written communication.  The only exception to this ‘is where there is a communication of 
information by someone to a professional, each acting in furtherance of the protection of children.’ This 
meant that there is ‘publication’ where information or documents are disseminated ‘to a journalist or to a 
Member of Parliament, a Minister of the Crown, a Law Officer, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the 
Crown Prosecution Service, the police (except when exercising child protection functions), the General 
Medical Council, or any other public body or public official’.65  This is a much broader definition of 
publication than that applied under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (below), which must be ‘addressed to 
the public at large’. 
Exemptions to s12 AJA in the family courts 
Following the ruling in Re B, there was concern at the level of restrictions on the ‘publication’ of information, 
especially for people who might be seeking help regarding their case – for example from their MP. The 
government consulted on relaxing these restrictions66 and the Family Procedure Rules were amended67 to 
permit certain classes of communication of information about proceedings heard in private, which were set 
out in a practice direction. These amendments were carried forward under the Family Procedure Rules 
201068, which specify that information about proceedings heard in private may be communicated for 
purposes specified in two associated practice directions: Practice Directions 14E and 12G.69 The practice 
directions permit the communication of information to, inter alia, McKenzie Friends ‘To enable the party to 
obtain advice or assistance in relation to the proceedings’, close family members ‘For the purpose of 
confidential discussions enabling the party to receive support from his spouse, civil partner, cohabitant or 
close family member’, healthcare professionals ‘To enable the party or any child of the party to obtain health 
                                                          
63 Re B (A Child), paragraph 82 
64 Where it is an offence under s97 Children Act to publish material which is intended or likely to identify any child 
involved in proceedings in which a power under the Children Act may be exercised by the court, or the address or 
school of that child. 
65 In the Matter of B (A Child), paragraph 82 
66 Department for Constitutional Affairs (2005) Disclosure of Information in Family Proceedings Cases Involving Children: 
Response to the public consultation, London. 
67 The Family Proceedings (Amendment No 4) Rules 2005 
68 Under rules 12.73 and 14.14 
69 Practice Direction 14E - Communication of information relating to proceedings; Practice Direction 12G - 
Communication of Information. 
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care or counselling’, and so on. They also permit parties and others to communicate information about 
proceedings to researchers conducting approved research projects.  
At the time of the roundtable, there was no equivalent practice direction in the CoP, which meant that the 
full restrictions of s12 AJA described in Re B applied there until very recently. The President of the Court of 
Protection, and the Vice President (Mr Justice Charles) publicly expressed a desire for a similar rule change 
and Practice Direction in the CoP.70  In 2015, amendments to the Court of Protection Rules (discussed below) 
included a provision that has permitted a similar practice direction to be adopted in the CoP.71 
COURT OF PROTECTION RULES 2007 
The CoP has its own rules of procedure, the Court of Protection Rules 2007, which may make provision ‘for 
enabling or requiring the proceedings or any part of them to be conducted in private and for enabling the 
court to determine who is to be admitted when the court sits in private and to exclude specified persons 
when it sits in public’72.  These were recently amended in response to a range of procedural issues, some of 
which have a bearing on transparency matters.73  It is likely that the Court of Protection Rules will undergo 
further review in relation to transparency issues in the future. 
Consultation on privacy issues under the Court of Protection Rules 
Shortly before the MCA came into force and the CoP began receiving applications the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs consulted on draft court rules in 2006. Surprisingly, the consultation document did not 
mention the issues raised in Re B. The government initially proposed that  ‘hearings of the Court of 
Protection should be in public but that a hearing, or any part of it, may be held in private if the court 
considers any of the circumstances set out at draft Rule 45(3) are met’.74 Provision for private hearings 
included, inter alia, cases where ‘publicity would defeat the object of the hearing’, it involves ‘confidential 
information (including information relating to personal financial matters) and publication would damage 
that confidentiality’ or is ‘necessary to protect the interests of P’.75 
There were 39 responses to the consultation; none of these responses seem to have come from 
representatives of the media.76  Representatives of the media who attended the roundtable observed that 
they were not specifically invited to respond, unlike other agencies.77  Of the 27 respondents who 
commented on the publicity questions, 12 supported the proposal that there should be a presumption that 
                                                          
70 The Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2013) Evidence Session No. 14. Tuesday 26 November 2013. 
Witnesses: Mr Justice Charles, Senior Judge Denzil Lush, District Judge Margaret Glentworth and District Judge Elizabeth 
Batten. House of Lords: London. Q292; House of Commons Justice Committee (2014) Written evidence received in 
connection with the work of the Court of Protection. London. 
71 s47 The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015 SI 2015/549 (L6), amendments to Rule 91.  See Practice 
Direction 13A - Hearings (Including reporting restrictions). 
72 s51 MCA 
73 The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015 SI 2015/549 (L6).  See the Explanatory Notes for background to the 
changes not relating to transparency. 
74 Department for Constitutional Affairs (2006) Draft Court Rules: Mental Capacity Act 2005 Court of Protection Rules. 
London. 
75 Draft rule 45(3) 
76 Department for Constitutional Affairs (2007) Draft court rules: Mental Capacity Act 2005. Court of Protection Rules: 
response to a consultation carried out by the Department for Constitutional Affairs. London. 
77 At the front of the consultation document is a list of organisations to whom the consultation was circulated. No 
media organisations are on that list, although the consultation was open to them to respond should they have learned 
of it by other means.  Department for Constitutional Affairs (2006) Draft Court Rules: Mental Capacity Act 2005 Court of 
Protection Rules, (CP 10/06, London). 
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hearings of the CoP should be held in public, whilst 11 opposed it. Even among those who favoured a 
starting point of publicity, there was a general view that in practice most proceedings would need to be held 
in private. Among the reported reasons given for favouring privacy, respondents felt that it would be ‘less 
daunting for vulnerable individuals and their families’. However, one respondent commented that publicity 
might protect the relevant person ‘by allowing public scrutiny of the conduct of those intending to benefit 
from any lifetime gift’.  
Those favouring a starting point that proceedings should be held in private contended that there was not 
sufficient public interest to justify hearings in public.  They argued that the relevant person’s interests of 
confidentiality and privacy were best served by private hearings, that the process could be distressing for the 
person and their family and if the person had capacity ‘they would not want their financial information to be 
in the public domain’. One respondent stated: 
‘An individual’s right to privacy in this case is greater than the need for a public policy of 
openness. The individuals concerned have already suffered the indignity of losing capacity 
and having to live by the decisions of others. The presumption should, therefore, be that 
hearings should be in private, unless the court considers it in the interests of public policy to 
be otherwise.’ 
The general rule on privacy 
Following the consultation, the government changed its 
position on the presumption of publicity. Accordingly, 
the Court of Protection Rules 2007 start from a 
presumption that hearings will be held in private, but 
with powers to order that a hearing be held in public. 
Rule 90 provides that ‘The general rule is that a hearing 
is to be held in private’, and – subject to any court order 
permitting or excluding others from attendance – the 
only persons who may attend the hearing are the 
parties, the relevant person, and their legal 
representatives. 
The CoP also has powers under Rule 91 to authorise the 
publication of information about proceedings held in 
private, or to restrict the publication of any identifying 
information or other information about the proceedings.  
The CoP may make an order under Rule 92 for a hearing 
to be in public, but it may exclude from that hearing any 
person or class of persons by court order.  The case of 
Steven Neary (right) is one example of the CoP using 
these powers.  When a hearing is in public the automatic 
restrictions of s12 AJA (above) do not apply, but the CoP 
may make an order under Rule 92 imposing reporting 
restrictions.   
Orders under Rules 90-92 may only be made ‘where it 
appears to the court that there is good reason for 
making the order’, and can be made at any time on the 
court’s own initiative or upon application by any 
person.78 
                                                          
78 Rule 93 
Steven Neary 
In 2010 Mark Neary, the father of a young 
man with autism and learning disabilities, 
began an online campaign to ‘Get Steven 
Home’.  Steven Neary had gone to spend a 
few days in respite care as his father was 
unwell, but when his father got better the 
London Borough of Hillingdon – who 
provided Steven’s care – refused to let him 
return home.  Steven was detained under the 
MCA deprivation of liberty safeguards.  Local 
news outlets reported on his father’s 
campaign.  When the case eventually 
reached the CoP, several media organisations 
applied for permission to attend and report 
on the proceedings, and to identify Steven 
and Mark Neary.  Jackson J granted this on 
the basis that many details of the case were 
already in the public domain, there was no 
evidence that this would cause detriment or 
distress to Steven or that irresponsible 
journalistic practices were likely.  Steven 
Neary was returned home by the Court of 
Protection, and his father gave several 
interviews in the media – helping to raise 
public awareness of problems with the 
deprivation of liberty safeguards. 
 17 
 
Committal proceedings  
The CoP has powers to punish 
individuals for contempt of court.79  
These punishments are made by an 
order of committal, and can include 
directions that the individual is to be 
arrested and imprisoned, subject to a 
hearing.80  The imprisonment of 
Kathleen Danby (right) is a recent 
example of the CoP exercising these 
powers.  Special rules govern 
transparency arrangements regarding 
committal hearings – the general 
presumption that hearings are in private 
is reversed, and where committal 
hearings are not held in public and the 
court finds that the person has 
committed a contempt of court, the 
court must publicly name the individual 
who has committed contempt, the 
nature of their offence and the 
punishment imposed.81  
Documents and court records 
There are also additional rules that 
permit the supply of documents to a 
non-party from court records82 and the 
subsequent use of court documents.83 
Recent amendments to the Court of Protection Rules 
Following the roundtable, amendments to the Court of Protection Rules 2007 were laid before Parliament 
and come into force in April and July 2015.84  Some of these changes have a bearing on the transparency 
framework for the CoP.   
Rule 91 was amended to introduce a similar exemption to s12 AJA to that which exists in family proceedings 
to permit the communication of information for specified purposes (discussed above).  These purposes are 
elaborated in Practice Direction 13A, which was amended following the rule change (discussed below; the 
amended version is given in Appendix 3).  The legal framework now permits the communication of 
information for a range of specified purposes, including making complaints, making applications to the 
European Court of Human Rights or enabling the parties – or their families – to obtain healthcare or 
counselling. 
                                                          
79 Part 21 Court of Protection Rules 2007 
80 Court of Protection Rules 2007 rules 185 - 194 
81 Rule 188 
82 Rule 17 
83 Rule 18 
84 The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015 SI 2015/549 (L6)  
Kathleen Danby 
The CoP had issued orders prohibiting Kathleen Danby from 
having contact with her grand-daughter, B. B has learning 
disabilities, and there had been care proceedings in the 
family court when she was a child, concerning her 
relationship with her father. It was said that when she saw 
her father or paternal grandmother this caused her distress 
and was unsettling, although she herself expressed a desire 
to see them. The council responsible for B’s care applied for a 
committal order, because Danby had breached the court 
orders and had been in contact with her granddaughter. 
Danby, who lived in Orkney, did not attend the hearing – 
although she was notified of it. HH Cardinal J sentenced her 
to three months in prison for contempt of court.  Danby 
chose not to attend a subsequent hearing to review this 
decision. Eventually, Danby was arrested when she was in 
England to see a concert. She spent two nights in jail before 
being brought before a CoP judge, where she purged her 
contempt and was released from prison. Although the 
committal hearings were in public and judgments naming 
Danby were published on BAILII, the media were critical of 
her treatment, and argued that there was not sufficient 
information in the public domain to say whether or not her 
punishment had been fair. 
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One important change for transparency purposes is that people will now be permitted to communicate 
information to researchers for the purpose of research projects authorised by the President of the CoP or 
the Lord Chancellor.   Until this rule change was introduced, researchers faced particular difficulties in 
speaking to litigants about their experiences, or doing research on court files or documents (discussed 
below).  
The rule changes also require the court to consider ‘whether any hearing should be held in public’ and 
‘whether any document should be a public document and, if so, whether and to what extent it should be 
redacted.’85  A new rule, 9A, makes provision for the operation of pilot schemes for assessing new practices 
and procedures.   These provisions are not discussed in the Explanatory Notes for the amendments, but may 
form the foundations of further transparency reforms in the future. 
PRACTICE DIRECTIONS 
Practice directions are issued by courts as a supplement to rules of procedure, to regulate procedural 
matters and provide additional information and guidance not contained within the rules.   
Practice Direction 13A 
The CoP has issued general guidance on the law and procedure relating to reporting restrictions in Practice 
Direction 13A – Hearings (including reporting restrictions); a full copy of the amended version is given in 
Appendix 3.  
PD13A reiterates that the general rule is that proceedings in the CoP will be held in private and so s12 AJA 
means that publication of any information about these proceedings will generally be a contempt of court. 
PD13A explains the content of Court of Protection Rules 90-93, set out above, and explains that an 
application for a reporting restrictions order under these rules must be made by filing a COP9 form.86  
PD13A draws attention to s12 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which applies where a court is considering 
granting any relief which might affect the exercise of the right to freedom of expression.87  Section 12 of the 
HRA states that in such circumstances if the person whose right to freedom of expression would be affected 
is not present or represented the court not grant such relief unless they are satisfied ‘that the applicant has 
taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent’ or ‘that there are compelling reasons why the 
respondent should not be notified’.  As the media will not typically be represented in CoP cases, this means 
that s12 HRA will generally require that they are notified of any applications for reporting restrictions, 
enabling them to make representations relating to their right to freedom of expression. 
PD13A also emphasises the ‘need to ensure that P’s Convention rights are protected’ when ‘the court is 
considering whether to make an order that a public hearing should be held’, and the general duty to act in 
P’s best interests.88 Further on, PD13A specifies that the court will need to balance Article 8 (right to respect 
for private and family life) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).  
On making orders to protect identities, the guidance states that: 
The aim should be to protect P rather than to confer anonymity on other individuals or 
organisations. However, the order may include restrictions on identifying or approaching 
specified family members, carers, doctors or organisations or other persons as the court 
directs in cases where the absence of such restriction is likely to prejudice their ability to 
                                                          
85 Rule 5, as amended 
86 Application notice form. 
87 Under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
88 Paragraph 11 
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care for P, or where identification of such persons might lead to identification of P and 
defeat the purpose of the order. In cases where the court receives expert evidence the 
identity of the experts (as opposed to treating clinicians) is not normally subject to 
restriction, unless evidence in support is provided for such a restriction.89 
On the duration of reporting restriction orders, PD13A states that: 
Orders should last for no longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which they are 
made. The order may need to last until P’s death. In some cases a later date may be 
necessary to maintain the anonymity of doctors or carers after the death of a patient.90 
The problem of confidentiality and publicity following the death of the relevant person has arisen in a 
number of recent cases,91 these are described in Appendix 2. 
PD13A says that orders will not generally be made restricting the publication of information already in the 
public domain. 
Guidance on notifying the media and the CopyDirect service 
PD13A also gives guidance on how to effect notification of the media about the possibility of reporting 
restrictions. It advises that service on national newspapers and broadcasters can be effected via the Press 
Association’s CopyDirect service (recently renamed the Injunction Application Alert Service), and states that 
making reporting restrictions without notifying the press should only occur in exceptional circumstances. 
Both the court when acting on its own initiative, and applicants relying upon Convention rights in seeking 
reporting restrictions, must effect service via this method, and details of how to do this are given.  
The PD also highlights that the CopyDirect service ‘does not extend to local or regional media or magazines’. 
Therefore, if reporting restrictions are required for any specific organisation or person not covered by the 
CopyDirect service, then it should be effected directly.92  
If the media decides that it wishes to respond to notice of an application for reporting restrictions it must file 
an acknowledgment of service using the COP5 form within 21 days.  Acknowledging service does not mean 
one becomes a party to the proceedings unless the court directs that it should.93 PD13A also includes as an 
annex an example of an explanatory note setting out the nature of the proceedings, which should be issued 
when serving notice of reporting restrictions. 
Reversal of presumption of private hearings for serious medical treatment cases 
Practice Direction 9E - Applications relating to serious medical treatment includes an important provision 
that reverses the general rule that the court will sit in private for serious medical treatment cases: 
The court will ordinarily make an order pursuant to rule 92 that any hearing shall be held in 
public, with restrictions to be imposed in relation to publication of information about the 
proceedings.94 
                                                          
89 Paragraph 27 
90 Paragraph 29 
91 Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals Foundation Trust v LM [2014] EWCOP 6; Re Meek [2014] EWCOP 1 
92 Paragraph 18 
93 On media applications to become a party to proceedings see G v London Borough of Redbridge, Associated 
Newspapers Limited and Others [2014] EWHC 1361, discussed in Appendix 2, below. 
94 Paragraph 16 
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Practice Direction - Committal for Contempt of Court 
On 26 March 2015, a new Practice Direction was issued by the Lord Chief Justice which applies across the 
civil courts, including the CoP.  It requires, in all cases where an individual is found to have committed a 
contempt of court and been sentenced to a term of imprisonment or a suspended term of imprisonment, 
that the court making the order must sit in public and set out: the name of the person; the nature of the 
sentence; and, in general terms, the nature of the contempt. These details and a written judgment are to be 
provided to the press and the Judicial Office website.95 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COMMON LAW 
Under English common law the courts must generally sit in public, but there are some traditional 
exemptions to this rule. In Scott v Scott96 Lord Shaw outlined three exceptions to the general rule of 
‘publicity’ in court proceedings: wardship proceedings concerning children; ‘lunacy proceedings’ and 
proceedings where the ‘essence of the case’ concerned some secret process (such as a trade secret) where 
publicity would defeat the purpose of the proceedings. He described the first two categories as ‘truly 
domestic affairs’ within the parens patriae protective jurisdiction.  
A similar qualified presumption that courts will sit in public 
can also be found under Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – the right to a fair trial.  
This provides that: 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press 
and public may be excluded from all or part of the 
trial in the interests of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private 
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the 
interests of justice. 
Although Article 6 includes a presumption that courts will sit 
publicly, publicity can also impede Article 6 rights to a fair 
trial where ‘it is asserted that the publication of information 
relating to proceedings, or attempts by the media to contact 
litigants, would affect the capacity or willingness of a party to 
participate in the litigation’.97 
‘Transparency’ issues also engage the right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 ECHR. Article 10 is a qualified 
right to ‘hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.’ However, since the exercise 
of these freedoms include ‘duties and responsibilities’ they may be subject to ‘such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests 
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
                                                          
95 Judiciary of England and Wales (2015) Practice Direction: Committal for Contempt of Court – Open Court, London. 
96 [1913] A.C. 417 at 33 
97 W v M & Ors [2011] EWHC 1197 (COP) Paragraph 38 
W v M 
M was in a minimally conscious state 
after a serious infection.  Her family felt 
that she would not wish to live in such 
circumstances and applied to the Court 
of Protection for her feeding tube to be 
withdrawn.  Her family were very 
distressed at the thought of being 
contacted by the press. Baker J held that 
the hearing should be in open court, but 
made orders prohibiting identification of 
M, her family or those caring for her, and 
orders prohibiting the media from 
approaching 65 people involved in caring 
for her.  Following a media outcry, this 
was later reduced to a smaller number 
of people.  The Court of Protection did 
not grant the order sought by the family 
to remove M’s feeding tube. 
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disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary’. 
Transparency issues also engage the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence 
under Article 8 ECHR. Article 8 is a qualified right, and any interference with it must be ‘in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
Although the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)98, as an unincorporated 
treaty, is not directly binding on the domestic courts, it is 
increasingly relied upon as a source of persuasive authority, 
particularly in relation to the interpretation of ECHR and 
also the Equality Act 2010.99  In AH v West London MH NHS 
Trust100 Albert Haines, a patient detained under the Mental 
Health Act 1983, applied for a public tribunal hearing.  The 
Mental Disability Advocacy Centre intervened in the case.  
They highlighted the significance of the CRPD in prohibiting 
discriminatory treatment of people with disabilities, and 
drew the Upper Tribunal’s attention to Article 13 CRPD, 
which obliges states to guarantee ‘effective access to justice 
for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others’.  
Counsel for Haines argued that it would be ‘unjustifiably 
stigmatising and discriminatory to insist that the public only 
be able to observe by video-link and would increase the 
social isolation of AH’.101  Carnwath LJ held that Article 6 
ECHR, reinforced by Article 13 CRPD, ‘requires that a patient 
should have the same or substantially equivalent right of 
access to a public hearing as a non-disabled person who has 
been deprived of his or her liberty, if this article 6 right to a 
public hearing is to be given proper effect’.102 
Publicity may also be a political act on the part of the relevant person, and therefore attract protection 
under Article 29 of the CRPD – the right to participation in political and public life.  In the case Westminster 
City Council v Sykes103 (above), Ms Sykes expressed a ‘strong wish’ for situation to be reported and for her to 
be named.  Although her specific rights in relation to publicity were not discussed, Eldergill DJ characterised 
this wish for publicity as political in character, stating: 
‘She has always wished to be heard. She would wish her life to end with a bang not a 
whimper. This is her last chance to exert a political influence which is recognisable as her 
                                                          
98 United Nations (2006) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered 
into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD) 
99 Burnip v Birmingham City Council & Anor (Rev 1) [2012] EWCA Civ 629; R (Bracking & Ors)  v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2013] EWHC 897 (Admin). 
100 [2011] UKUT 74 (AAC) 
101 §20 
102 §22 
103 [2014] EWHC B9 (COP) 
Manuela Sykes 
Manuela Sykes, born in 1925, was a British 
politician who left the Liberal party and joined 
the Labour party.  She campaigned on a wide 
range of issues, including feminist and socialist 
causes.  When her mother developed dementia, 
she campaigned about the treatment of the 
elderly in care homes.  Sykes herself developed 
dementia, and was admitted to a care home 
under a deprivation of liberty safeguards 
authorisation issued by Westminster council.  
Sykes was very unhappy in the care home, and 
her representative helped her to appeal to the 
CoP.   The court heard that there were serious 
risks of a return home, but felt these were risks 
that Sykes would have been prepared to take, 
and terminated the deprivation of liberty 
authorisation, meaning that Sykes returned 
home.  At her request, she was identified in the 
media and her case received much publicity. 
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influence. Her last contribution to the country's political scene and the workings and 
deliberations of the council and social services committee which she sat on.’ 
He made orders giving the media permission to publish a photograph of her from when she was a well 
known campaigner, and to name her but not her relatives. 
TRANSPARENCY GUIDANCE: COMMITTALS 
Following critical media coverage of the case of Wanda 
Maddocks (right), who was jailed by the CoP for contempt 
of court, the President issued practice guidance on 
committal proceedings.104 This Practice Guidance primarily 
reiterated existing court rules which specify that committal 
proceedings must – as a general rule – be heard in public, 
and if in an exceptional case the court sits in private the 
judge must publish the contemnor’s name, the nature of 
the contempt (in general terms) and any punishment 
imposed.105 The guidance also specified that where a 
committal order, or suspended committal order is made, 
judges should ensure that a judgment or statement 
containing this information is prepared at public expense 
and published on the British and Irish Legal Information 
Institute (BAILII) website.106 Supplementary guidance was 
issued a month later which stated that ‘every committal 
application without exception’ should be publicly listed as 
such, with the names of the alleged contemnors. It also 
emphasized that the court’s discretionary power to hear 
committal proceedings in private ‘should be exercised only 
in exceptional cases’. The supplementary guidance also 
stated that the court may authorize disclosure of the 
application notice to a person who is not a party, unless 
there are exceptional circumstances.107 
This guidance preceded new committal guidance (discussed above) for all courts which requires the media 
to be notified and a judgment to be placed on the Judiciary website108 in all cases where the court finds that 
a person has committed a contempt of court.109 
TRANSPARENCY GUIDANCE: JUDGMENTS 
Prior to his appointment as President of the Family Division and the Court of Protection, Sir James Munby 
had expressed the view that these courts needed to make more anonymised judgments publically 
accessible, stating: 
I am not merely referring to judgments which are thought to be reportable because of their 
perceived legal interest. Releasing for publication only those judgments which are 
                                                          
104 Committal For Contempt Of Court (Practice Guidance) [2013] EWHC B4 (COP) 2013 
105 Court of Protection Rules 2007 rule 188. 
106 www.bailii.org 
107 Committal For Contempt Of Court (Practice Guidance – Supplemental) [2013] EWHC B7 (COP) 2013. 
108 www.judiciary.gov.uk/ 
109 Judiciary of England and Wales (2015) Practice Direction: Committal for Contempt of Court – Open Court London. 
Wanda Maddocks 
Wanda Maddocks was jailed by the Court of 
Protection for breach of court orders relating 
to her father’s care.  The committal hearing 
was in ‘open court’ but the media were not 
notified and did not attend.  Maddocks 
herself chose not to attend the committal 
hearing.  An anonymised judgment was 
placed on a specialist mental health law 
website.   Six months later, Maddocks gave 
interviews to the media, who described her 
as having been ‘jailed in secret’.  Following a 
media outcry, Munby P issued guidance 
reminding judges of the general rule that 
Committal hearings be heard in public and 
the individual identified.  He also stated that 
judgments should be published on the more 
widely read BAILII website. 
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'reportable' means that the public obtains a seriously skewed impression of the system. 
What one might call 'routine' judgments in 'ordinary' care cases and private law cases should 
surely also be published -- all of them, unless, in the particular case, there is good reason not 
to.110 
In 2013, the President published draft practice guidance on 
the publication of judgments111, and in 2014 – shortly after 
a widespread media outcry over Alessandra Pacchieri’s case 
(right) - he issued practice guidance based on this 
consultation.112  
In this guidance he stated that ‘Very similar issues arise in 
both the Family Court... and the Court of Protection in 
relation to the need to protect the personal privacy of 
children and vulnerable adults’, and his starting point was 
that ‘so far as possible the same rules and principles should 
apply in both the family courts... and the Court of 
Protection.’113 The guidance distinguished between two 
classes of judgments: those which should ordinarily be 
published, and those which may be published.114 The 
guidance states that judgments of the CoP should ordinarily 
be published if they relate to any of the following matters: 
- any application for an order involving the giving or 
withholding of serious medical treatment and any 
other hearing held in public;  
- any application for a declaration or order involving 
a deprivation or possible deprivation of liberty;  
- any case where there is a dispute as to who should 
act as an attorney or a deputy;  
- any case where the issues include whether a person 
should be restrained from acting as an attorney or a 
deputy or that an appointment should be revoked 
or his or her powers should be reduced;  
- any application for an order that an incapacitated 
adult (P) be moved into or out of a residential establishment or other institution;  
- any case where the sale of P’s home is in issue 
- any case where a property and affairs application relates to assets (including P’s home) of £1 million 
or more or to damages awarded by a court sitting in public; 
- any application for a declaration as to capacity to marry or to consent to sexual relations;  
                                                          
110 Lord Justice Munby (2010) ‘Lost opportunities: law reform and transparency in the family courts’, Child and Family 
Law Quarterly, 273. 
111 Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division and President of the Court of Protection, (2013) Draft Practice 
Guidance: Transparency in the Family Courts and the Court of Protection: Publication of Judgments, London. 
112 Practice Guidance (Transparency in the Court Of Protection) [2014] EWCOP B2 (see also: Practice Guidance 
(Transparency in the Family Courts) [2014] EWHC B3 (Fam)) 
113 Paragraph 6 
114 Paragraph 15 
Alessandra Pacchieri 
In November 2013 Christopher Booker 
reported in the Telegraph that a pregnant 
Italian woman had been detained under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 whilst visiting the UK, 
and that at the request of local authority 
social workers the courts had granted 
permission for her child to be delivered by a 
forcible caesarean in a hearing in which she 
was represented by lawyers appointed by the 
local authority.  At the time of publication, no 
judgments were available about the case to 
confirm or refute this report.  When the 
judgments were published, it transpired the 
order for a caesarean was granted by the 
Court of Protection at the request of doctors 
rather than social worker, who were 
concerned about health risks from labour not 
child protection.  Pacchieri was represented in 
court by the Official Solicitor not local 
authority lawyers.  However, academic and 
professional lawyers raised concerns about 
the case. 
Following the media outcry about this case, 
the President issued guidance on the 
publication of judgments.   
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- any application for an order involving a restraint on publication of information relating to the 
proceedings.115 
In all other cases, judgments may be published if a party or an ‘accredited member of the media’ makes an 
application and the judge – having considered the relevant rights116 – concludes that it may be.117 Permission 
to publish a judgment should also be given ‘whenever the judge concludes that publication would be in the 
public interest and whether or not a request has been made by a party or the media.’118 
Where permission to publish a judgment is given, the following guidance was given regarding anonymity: 
- public authorities and expert witnesses should be named in the judgment approved for publication, 
unless there are compelling reasons why they should not be so named;  
- the person who is the subject of proceedings in the Court of Protection and other members of their 
family should not normally be named in the judgment approved for publication unless the judge 
otherwise orders;  
- anonymity in the judgment as published should not normally extend beyond protecting the privacy 
of the adults who are the subject of the proceedings and other members of their families, unless 
there are compelling reasons to do so.119 
Guidance was given as to the rubric (or implied rubric) at the top of the judgment, setting conditions of 
anonymity.120 
The guidance applies to ‘all judgments in the Court of Protection delivered by the Senior Judge, nominated 
Circuit Judges and High Court Judges.’121 However, this does not preclude district judges from publishing 
judgments in the CoP.122 
One of the issues that arose during the consultation was who should bear the cost of transcribing the 
judgments. The guidance states that where a person has made an application for the judgment to be 
published, they should bear the cost of transcription, but in all other cases the cost of transcribing the 
judgment should be at public expense.123 The guidance also stated that where a judgment fell into the 
category meaning it should ordinarily be published, ‘it shall as soon as reasonably practicable be placed by 
the court on the BAILII website’, and that for other judgments consideration should be given to placing it on 
BAILII.124 
  
                                                          
115 Paragraph 17 
116 Paragraph 18 
117 Paragraph 17 
118 Paragraph 16 
119 Paragraph 20 
120 Paragraph 21 
121 Paragraph 14 
122 Westminster City Council v Sykes [2014] EWHC B9 (COP) 
123 Paragraph 22 
124 Paragraph 23 
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This guidance has already had a noticeable impact on the number of judgments published on the BAILII 
website: 
  
Since the practice guidance on judgments was published, 63% of all judgments published on BAILII that have 
involved a public authority have identified it in the judgment. 
 
A HEALTHCARE NHS TRUST V P & Q AND THE CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT 1981 
Following the roundtable, further clarification of the legal framework governing transparency in the CoP was 
provided by A Healthcare NHS Trust v P & Q125.  This case also highlighted potential limitations in the 
protection of privacy in the CoP which may need to be addressed in due course. 
The case concerned an application from an NHS Trust to withhold and potentially also to withdraw life 
sustaining treatment from a man who had experienced severe hypoxic brain damage from a cardiac arrest.  
The Trust believed he was unlikely to regain consciousness, the family objected, and so the Trust made an 
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application to the CoP for declarations as to his best interests.  The family sought a reporting restriction 
order to protect their identities. 
A question arose as to whether the media, when being notified of the application for a reporting restriction 
order, should also be provided with the names of the parties.  The family’s solicitors were concerned that 
providing the media with information about the family’s identities could itself be a contempt of court.126 The 
question addressed by court was whether the media must be provided with this information.   
Counsel for the family expressed concern that when providing the media with this information, before any 
reporting restrictions came into force, it was unclear what prohibited the media from publishing the 
information.  As discussed above, the ‘automatic’ restraints of s12 AJA do not extend to prohibiting the 
publication of information about the identities of the parties or the subject matter of the dispute.  It was 
suggested by counsel for the family that there was either a lacuna in the law, which meant that there was a 
theoretical risk that the media could publish information they were notified of before the reporting 
restriction order was made, or that the criminal offence of publishing information that could identify a child 
in family proceedings127 should extend - by analogy - to the CoP.128  Mr Justice Newton rejected this latter 
suggestion as an unsound analogy,129 but the question remained as to what prevented the media from 
publishing information about the identities of parties if they were notified of it.   
Media representatives argued that this risk had never materialised in over ten years of using the CopyDirect 
service to notify the media of applications for reporting restrictions in family proceedings.  If a media 
organisation were to take a ‘maverick course’ and publish this information, it would ‘at a stroke’ destroy this 
established practice.130  Newton J stated that the hypothetical risk that one ‘rogue editor’ could abuse their 
position should not mean that ‘freedom is lost by all members of the Press’.131 
Media representatives also pointed towards contractual obligations with CopyDirect which prevented them 
for using this information for editorial purposes.132  Moreover, Newton J held that on any reasonable view 
this information was confidential and so media organisations were under an equitable duty to treat it as 
such.133 
Ultimately, however, Newton J held that the publication of this information would be a contempt of court 
under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and/or the common law.134  The 1981 Act prohibits publication 
‘addressed to the public at large or any section of the public’ at a time when proceedings are active, which 
‘creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded 
or prejudiced’.135  Newton J held that ‘publication by the media of the identity of P or the parties is likely to 
amount to a contempt under’ the 1981 Act because this would be publication addressed to the public at 
large that would carry a ‘more than a remote risk of serious prejudice or impediment to the course of justice 
(since it would render the application for reporting restrictions redundant)’.136  In the ‘unlikely event’ that 
                                                          
126 §41 
127 s97 Children Act 1989 
128 §46 
129 §47 
130 §65 
131 §50 
132 §61-2 
133 §63-4 
134 §56 
135 s1 Contempt of Court Act 1981 
136 §56 
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strict liability statutory contempt was not established under the 1981 Act, common law contempt ‘could 
clearly be established’.137 
This case highlights a degree of uncertainty about the ‘automatic’ restraints prohibiting the publication of 
information about the identity of parties in CoP proceedings.  The restrictions imposed by the common law 
and the Contempt of Court Act 1981 against publishing identifying information about the parties and the 
relevant person apply once an application for reporting restrictions has been made.  It does not appear that 
these restrictions would apply in the absence of any such application.  Thus it seems that privacy may not be 
fully protected in the CoP unless with a specific application for reporting restriction.  
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS? 
New Court of Protection Rules on ‘transparency’? 
Following the report of the House of Lords Committee on the MCA138 the government committed to a 
revision of the Court of Protection Rules 2007, with a view to having new rules in place by April 2015.139 A 
written memorandum from Sir James Munby and Mr Justice Charles to the House of Commons Justice 
Committee expressed the view that new provisions needed to be considered for ‘the disclosure of 
documents to defined people for defined purposes e.g. to researchers, regulators etc’.140   
An ad hoc committee was established to consider changes to the rules, whose primary focus was on 
providing a ‘streamlined’ procedure for handling non-contentious deprivation of liberty applications.141 The 
amendments were laid before Parliament in March 2015, and introduced the changes described above 
which permit the communication of information about proceedings for certain purposes, such as research, 
and laying the framework for future potential reforms which may involve making public certain court 
documents or embarking upon pilot projects relating to transparency. 
Media attendance in Court of Protection Proceedings? 
As noted earlier, Sir James Munby has in the past expressed the view that the CoP should be brought into 
line with the family courts regarding the default position that accredited journalists are allowed to attend 
proceedings except in certain narrowly defined circumstances.142  It is possible that reforms of this nature 
may be considered in the future, in a further review of the Rules. 
                                                          
137 §57, citing A-G v Newspapers Publishing plc [1997] 1 WLR 926 at 936B-D  
138 House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2014) Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative 
scrutiny, (Report of Session 2013–14) TSO: London. 
139 HM Government (2014) Valuing every voice, respecting every right: Making the case for the Mental Capacity Act. The 
Government’s response to the House of Lords Select Committee Report on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, (Cm 8884) 
London. Paragraph 2.7 
140 House of Commons Justice Committee (2014) Written evidence received in connection with the work of the Court of 
Protection, London. Paragraph 24. 
141 X & Ors (Deprivation of Liberty) [2014] EWCOP 25 
142 Sir James Munby (2013) ‘Opening up the Family Courts: Transparency in the Family Court and the Court of 
Protection’, paper presented at Annual Conference of the Society of Editors ‘Freedom to Inform’ London, on 11 
November 2013. 
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A new Court of Protection website? 
The House of Lords Committee on the MCA heard evidence from staff and judiciary at the CoP that they 
themselves were unable to communicate information to the public directly as they had no control over the 
information published on the central government website dedicated to the CoP.143  The Committee stated: 
‘We are persuaded that the Court of Protection has a range of audiences requiring access to 
information for professional or personal reasons, and that the staff and judiciary of the 
Court are best placed to determine what that information should be recommended in its 
report that the Court of Protection establish its own website.’144 
However, the government stated in their response: 
9.3  The Government’s Digital Strategy is for a single government web domain for the public 
to access information about government services. Government Digital Service (GDS) sets 
standards for information provision, web best practice and user needs.   
9.4  The Government agrees that the availability of increased information regarding the 
Court of Protection would go some way to improving accessibility of the Court and we will 
work with GDS to develop the content on the Court of Protection. We will also consider 
other means of releasing information about the court appropriate to different users.145 
Accordingly, information about the Court of Protection may appear on either the central Gov.UK website146 
or may be published on the Courts and Tribunal Judiciary website.147 
Access to court documents, listing of cases and more public hearings? 
In 2014 the President issued a new consultation on the ‘next steps’ for transparency in the Family Courts.148 
This consultation invites views on the operation of the practice guidance for the publication of judgments – 
and in particular the impact on children and families, local authorities and ‘Any change in the level and 
quality of news and reporting about the family justice system’. The consultation also canvassed views on 
steps which could be taken to enhance the listing of Family Division and Family Court cases so that the court 
lists are more informative for the media. He also canvassed views about a possible pilot project to explore 
the disclosure of documents prepared by advocates and some expert reports149 to the media.  
The President also sought ‘preliminary, pre-consultation’ views on hearing certain types of family case in 
public.  This latter suggestion drew criticism from children’s groups and family lawyers, who warned that 
children may decline to give evidence if they know that the public will attend out of fear of inadvertent 
                                                          
143 https://www.gov.uk/court-of-protection 
144 House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2014) Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative 
scrutiny, (Report of Session 2013–14) TSO: London. 
145 HM Government (2014) Valuing every voice, respecting every right: Making the case for the Mental Capacity Act. The 
Government’s response to the House of Lords Select Committee Report on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, (Cm 8884) 
London. 
146 https://www.gov.uk/court-of-protection 
147 http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/ 
148 Sir James Munby (2014) ‘Transparency – The Next Steps: A Consultation Paper issued by the President of the Family 
Division on 15 August 2014’, Family Law, available: http://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/transparency-
the-next-steps-a-consultation-paper-issued-by-the-president-of-the-family-division-on-15-august-2014#.U_HF5PldV8G 
[accessed 20 August 2014] 
149 In the first instance, confined to those from the ‘hard sciences’. 
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identification.150  The results of the consultation and reform proposals arising from it have not yet been 
published. 
Nothing in this consultation document refers to the CoP, however it seems possible that given the 
President’s preference for harmonizing the practices of the CoP and the Family Court that similar 
consultations may eventually follow for the CoP. 
COMPARISON: MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNALS 
The CoP was established to adjudicate on issues arising under the MCA connected with a person’s mental 
capacity and best interests.  This spans a range of different matters, including property and affairs, health 
and personal welfare, and also issues connected with deprivation of liberty under the MCA. 
The Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) regulates detention and compulsory treatment for mental disorder.   The 
MHA and the MCA are distinct legal instruments, with different powers and underlying principles, although 
in some cases they do intersect with each other – giving rise to a highly complex area of law.151  A person 
who is detained under the MHA may seek review of the awfulness of that detention before a Mental Health 
Tribunal152.  This offers an interesting contrast to the CoP in terms of its legal framework for transparency 
and public perceptions of secrecy.  However, it should be remembered that the Mental Health Tribunals deal 
only with the issue of detention or whether the patient should remain subject to a community treatment 
order or guardianship.153 The Court of Protection deals with a much broader range of health and personal 
welfare issues, including, but not confined to, deprivation of liberty. 
Public hearings 
In England, the First Tier Tribunal (Mental Health), which hears appeals under the Mental Health Act 1983, 
sits in private ‘unless the Tribunal considers that it is in the interests of justice for the hearing to be held in 
public’.154 The Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales sits in private ‘Except where a patient requests a 
hearing in public and the Tribunal is satisfied that that would be in the interests of the patient, all hearings 
must be held in private.’155 Only a very small number of Tribunal hearings have been held in public, including 
that of Albert Haines156, Ian Brady157 and Jared Britton.158   As discussed above, Haines successfully argued 
for a public hearing, relying upon Article 6 ECHR, reinforced by Article 13 CRPD.  
                                                          
150 Gibb, F. (2015) ‘Judge attacked over bid to hold family cases in public’, The Times, 01 January 2015. 
151 Clare, I. C. H., Redley, M., Keeling, A., Wagner, A., Wheeler, J., Gunn, M. and Holland, A. J. (2013) Understanding the 
interface between the Mental Capacity Act's deprivation of liberty safeguards (MCA-DOLS) and the Mental Health Act 
(MHA),  University of Cambridge. 
152 In Wales these are known as Mental Health Review Tribunals and in England, the tribunal is the First Tier Tribunal 
(Mental Health). 
153 Community treatment orders and guardianship are legal powers to impose certain requirements relating to care, 
treatment and residence for patients living in the community. 
154 Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 SI 2008/2699, Rule 
38. 
155 Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales Rules 2008Rule 25 
156  AH v West London MH NHS Trust [2011] UKUT 74 (AAC) 
157 In The Matter of an Application by Ian Stuart Brady [2014] FTT MH 
158 Re Jared Britton [2013] MHLO 146 (FTT) 
 30 
 
Reporting restrictions 
Section 12 of the AJA applies to the private hearings in the Mental Health Tribunals,159 imposing similar 
restrictions on the communication of information to those in the CoP discussed above.  Unlike the CoP, 
however, the Tribunals do have explicit restrictions on the publication of identifying information.  The 
English and the Welsh Tribunal Rules contain a presumption that ‘Unless the Tribunal gives a direction to the 
contrary, information about mental health cases and the names of any persons concerned in such cases 
must not be made public.’ 160   
A similar provision prohibiting the naming of patients existed under the 1983 Mental Health Review Tribunal 
Rules and was considered in Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo.161   As well as confirming that s12 AJA 
did not prohibit the naming of patients, Lord Bridge construed the rules as only ‘dealing with proceedings at 
the hearing’162 rather than the fact an application had been made by the patient to the tribunal.  The new 
construction of the rules is more expansive and applies to ‘information about mental health cases’ 
(emphasis added) rather than ‘proceedings’.  They might therefor be considered to restrict the publication of 
information about an application to the tribunal about a particular patient, as well as what occurred in a 
hearing.  One potential concern remains, however.  In Pickering Lord Bridge expressed doubt that the power 
to make tribunal rules of procedure conferred by s78 MHA conferred sufficient authority to impose a ban on 
the publication of this information, but this point was not fully reasoned or argued.163  Consequently, the 
legal authority of the existing tribunal rules to restrict the publication of information was called into question 
– but not wholly determined – in Pickering and may require further clarification. 
Although Mental Health Tribunals only very rarely sit in public, they do not appear to have been labelled as a 
‘secret courts’ in the media.  The reasons for their different treatment by the media from the Court of 
Protection are unclear.
                                                          
159 Section 12 AJA also applies to applications to the county court to displace a person from the role of nearest relative 
to a patient who is subject to the MHA. 
160Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 SI 2008/2699, rule 
14(7);  Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales Rules 2008,SI 2008/2705, rule 10 (1). 
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THE ROUNDTABLE 
The roundtable discussion brought together people from different backgrounds and with differing 
perspectives on ‘transparency’ to discuss the current legal framework in the CoP.  Participants included 
researchers in mental capacity and mental health law, judges of the CoP, solicitors and barristers and 
litigation friends with considerable experience of CoP welfare cases, civil servants, and representatives of 
three media organisations – including print and broadcast media, and those who have campaigned for 
greater ‘transparency’ in the CoP.  A person with experience of being a litigant in a CoP welfare case and a 
social worker with considerable experience of the MCA and experience of a publicised court case were 
invited to attend, but unfortunately they were unable to do so due to unforeseen circumstances.  In total, 23 
people attended on the day. 
The roundtable was held at the Nuffield Foundation headquarters in London, in September 2014.  It was 
structured so that participants heard short presentations on the following topics, followed by a chaired 
discussion of the issues raised: 
- Media attendance and reporting restrictions in the CoP 
- Research in the CoP  
- The publication of CoP judgments 
Attendance at the roundtable and the discussions were held under the Chatham House Rules, a system 
named after the headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which is designed to facilitate 
full and frank discussion whilst protecting anonymity.164  Roundtables held under the Chatham House Rules 
have been very effective in promoting discussion of key policy issues relating to the MCA.165   
This report is based on notes and recordings of the roundtable.  It is organised according to the themes that 
were discussed by participants, rather than chronologically.   
GENERAL VIEWS ON TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY 
All participants expressed support for the principle of greater transparency in the CoP.  One media 
representative quoted a colleague as saying: 
‘The Court of Protection deals with issues of the utmost seriousness, including the 
deprivation of liberty safeguards. The idea that anyone should be able to apply to have 
someone effectively locked up for any amount of time without the press, and through the 
press the public, being able to scrutinize what is going on is surely contrary to good sense 
and open justice.’166 
                                                          
164 Under the rules, participants are free to use the information from the roundtable and any points made, but are 
asked not to identify other participants or their affiliations when discussing any comments they have made.  
165 The Essex Autonomy Project at the University of Essex has made particularly strong use of this method, for examples 
see: Szerletics, A. and O’Shea, T. (2012) Deprivation of Liberty and DoLS: An AHRC Public Policy Roundtable (Essex 
Autonomy Project, Ministry of Justice, Arts and Humanities Research Council); Martin, W. (2014) ‘Mental Capacity Law 
Discussion Paper: Consensus Emerges in Consultation Roundtables: The MCA is Not Compliant with the CRPD’, 39 Essex 
St Mental Capacity Law Newsletter, August (Issue 49).  These reports are available on the project website: 
http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/ 
166 One issue that was not discussed during the roundtable was that the Mental Health Tribunals in England and Wales 
routinely hear cases in private that concern the liberty of patients detained under the Mental Health Act 1983.  For 
reasons unknown, the media have not described this as a secret court nor expressed the view that these cases should 
also be subject to public scrutiny.  The rules governing ‘privacy’ and ‘transparency’ in the Tribunals are discussed in the 
outline of the legal framework, above. 
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Open justice was said to be the ‘defining norm’, against which exceptions must be justified.  Participants 
stressed not only the Article 10 rights of the media to impart information, but also the Article 10 rights of the 
public to receive information.  Lord Neuberger’s view that ‘Open justice is an essential feature of the rule of 
law’ was endorsed, as was his comment that in some cases ‘secrecy’ is necessary but ‘should only be 
permitted if it is absolutely necessary, and, even then, it should be kept to a minimum.’167  However, one 
participant drew a distinction between ‘open justice’ and ‘transparency’; they felt that if everything was 
published nobody would take any notice. 
Enhancing public understanding of the work of the Court of Protection 
A recurring theme throughout the day was the importance of ‘transparency’ in improving public 
understanding of the work of the CoP.  Media representatives argued that a lack of media scrutiny could 
engender public suspicion of the justice system.  A journalist with experience of reporting on CoP cases 
expressed the view that no-one who sat in the CoP and witnessed a case could fail to be favourably 
impressed by the judges, and that the public needed to know that they made the most difficult decisions. 
Lawyers expressed concern about use of the word ‘secrecy’ to describe the CoP, feeling it was very emotive 
and inaccurate.  However, they maintained that the public needed to know what the CoP did and the issues 
needed to be discussed.   
In a discussion on the value of public hearings for public education, a researcher highlighted that there are 
other ways of educating the public than hearings in open court. 
Protection against miscarriages of justice 
A number of participants felt that publicity could play in protecting against miscarriages of justice.   
One participant described importance of publicity in highlighting flawed expert evidence.  They cited the role 
of publicity in drawing attention to concerns about expert evidence provided by Professor Roy Meadow, 
which had been relied upon in the prosecutions of a number of women for the murder of their infant 
children.  Following publicity about the quashed convictions of Sally Clark168 and Angela Cannings’169, the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission reviewed several other cases, and other convictions were found to be 
unsafe.  It was suggested at the roundtable that if this had not been a criminal case, where Meadow’s claims 
received public scrutiny and were widely discredited, then experts might still be making such 
pronouncements. 
The case of Steven Neary was also cited as an example of the media playing a role in protecting against 
miscarriages of justice.  Steven Neary was a young man with autism and learning disabilities.  He had been 
unlawfully deprived of his liberty by the London Borough of Hillingdon.  In his autobiographical account of 
his experiences of trying to get his son home, Mark Neary wrote that he approached the media out of 
desperation, ‘I knew I needed support from different angles. I wasn’t getting anywhere trying to carry the 
fight on my own and… I was frightened that the bulldozer would carry Steven away for good.’170  Similarly, 
                                                          
167 Lord Neuberger (2014) 'The Third and Fourth Estates: Judges, Journalists and Open Justice', paper presented at The 
Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents’ Club, on 26 August 2014.  Paragraph 12. 
168 R v Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020.  Although, note that the statistical fallacy committed by Professor Meadow was 
not regarded as sufficient for quashing the conviction in an earlier appeal, R v Clark [2000] EWCA Crim 54, and it was 
more recent medical findings that proved decisive in the second appeal.    
169 R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1 
170 M Neary, Get Steven Home (Lulu.com, London 2011).  For Mark Neary’s account of the media involvement in his 
case, see: J Taylor, M Neary and R Canneti, 'Opening closed doors of justice', (2012) 23 British Journalism Review p42. 
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the case of Ashya King171 was also cited as a case which required media scrutiny because the police and 
prosecutors had been accused of acting unlawfully. 
One participant cited a report by the Queensland Law Reform Commission entitled Public Justice, Private 
Lives.172  The report identifies ‘disciplinary’, ‘educative’ and ‘investigative’ rationales for ‘open justice’, which 
it describes as follows: 
Central to the disciplinary rationale of open justice is that it acts as a safeguard against 
judicial ‘partiality, arbitrariness, or idiosyncrasy’ and is thus a means of accountability. The 
disciplinary rationale also views open justice as acting as a check on legal counsel and 
against dishonest testimony. 
An open court has also been said to fulfil an educative function by informing the public 
about the law and legal process, and by prompting judicial arbiters to educate themselves in 
‘prevailing public morality and thereby avoid public criticism’. Open justice also promotes 
predictability and consistency in decision-making in that both decision-makers and those 
advising people about the law are aware of previous decisions and can act accordingly. 
Finally, under the investigative rationale, it has been argued that an open court facilitates 
the production of additional witnesses and therefore plays an important part in securing 
completeness of testimony.173 
A researcher questioned whether there was any evidence that judges might ‘misbehave’ without greater 
transparency, and asked whether this had been studied systematically.174  Another researcher observed that 
the reasoning in judgments of cases concerning interventions during pregnancy and childbirth was much 
better in the published judgments that came after the decision in Re AA175- the case concerning Alessandra 
Pacchieri176 – which was not published until after the media drew attention to the case.177  A lawyer 
commented that a large number of cases followed in the wake of Pacchieri’s case, and the courts were asked 
to give guidance on when they needed to go to court and how they should be approached.178  Thus, it was 
suggested, the negative publicity surrounding this case increased awareness of the need for these matters to 
be referred to the court, prompted better guidance and led to more satisfactory judicial reasoning. 
                                                          
171 Re Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964 (Fam). Ashya King is a young boy who had cancer.  His parents removed him from 
hospital because they preferred a treatment for cancer that the hospital refused to offer in the belief that it would 
cause him less harm.  On finding the child gone and being concerned for his health, the police issued an European 
Arrest Warrant.  The parents were found to be in Spain, and were remanded in custody.  Following their arrest, the 
case attracted considerable publicity and the authorities were criticised – particularly for the arrest of the parents.   The 
case came before the family court, where Baker J ordered that the parents did have permission to take their son to 
Prague to receive their preferred treatment. 
172 Queensland Law Reform Commission, Public Justice, Private Lives: A New Approach to Confidentiality in the 
Guardianship System. Report (Report No 62, Volume 1, Brisbane 2007) 
173 Paragraphs 3.29-3.31 
174 The authors have been unable to find any such studies in a literature search. 
175 [2012] EWHC 4378 (COP) 
176 This case is described in more detail in Appendix 2 
177 For a similar view, see: Walmsley, E. (2014) 'Mama Mia! Serious shortcomings with another '(en)forced' caesarean 
section case Re AA [2012] EWHC 3278 (COP)', Medical Law Review, doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fwu034 
178 NHS Trust & Ors v FG (Rev 1) [2014] EWCOP 30 
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Publicity as a corrective to misinformation in the public domain 
Publicity was claimed to be a corrective to judgments that did not fully report the facts; conversely it was 
also said that open judgments could be a corrective to inaccurate journalism. 
One media representative argued that judgments only give a ‘potted summary’ of the facts and can be open 
to misinterpretation.  They highlighted that where there was a delay in publishing the judgment this could 
lead to inaccurate reporting, and they argued that accurate reporting would be assisted by responsible 
reporters sitting in court, which is not facilitated by the rules as they are currently drafted. 
Another participant, however, highlighted the important role that published judgments could play in helping 
to check the facts of cases described in media reports.  Although the availability of judgments does not 
guarantee accurate reporting, it does allow the public to check for themselves at source.  Adam Wagner, the 
founder of the UK Human Rights Blog179, advanced arguments to the Leveson Inquiry that bloggers could use 
published judgments to correct inaccurate or otherwise poor journalism.180 
Journalists working in print media discussed the loss of expertise in legal journalism.  There are now fewer 
court specialists who regularly check BAILII for new cases.  One journalist described a news editor who did 
not understand what was meant by Ashya King being made a ward of court.  They commented that nobody 
knows how the system works because they cannot get in. 
One participant highlighted concerns that publicity about CoP cases tended to be skewed towards situations 
where things had gone wrong.  They were concerned that advance planning tools such as Lasting Powers of 
Attorney (LPAs) might come to be seen as tools for abuse, deterring people from engaging in advance 
planning for future loss of mental capacity.  They argued that good reporting on what was done well and to 
prevent abuse was also necessary. 
The value of open and accessible judgments 
The roundtable participants discussed the value of publishing more judgments of the CoP.  ‘Open judgments’ 
were said to serve an increasingly important function in ensuring ‘access to justice’ for litigants in person.   A 
solicitor with considerable experience of acting for the families of disabled children agreed that parents 
often have difficulties accessing justice, and commented that they ‘devour’ judgments.  The author of a legal 
blog found that search terms used by people arriving at her blog indicated that people were looking for 
reliable sources of legal information. 
Some participants expressed concern that judgments could be unnecessarily ‘long winded’ and inaccessible.  
For truly ‘open justice’, it was argued, information needs to be easily accessible, affordable and simple to 
understand and apply; Lord Neuberger has commented that judgments must ‘be capable of speaking clearly 
to a lay audience’.181  
At various points during the roundtable, discussion arose as to who the intended ‘audience’ of a judgment 
was.  Judges agreed that the main intended audience for the judgments are the litigants, so that they 
understand the judge’s reasoning and can appeal if they disagree with argument or the weighting of the 
facts.  One participant with past experience of being a lay advocate for people detained under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) coming into force stated that they had experience  
of tribunal cases where people were often not aware of the reasons for their detention.   
                                                          
179 http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/ 
180 Wagner’s evidence can be downloaded from here: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/Witness-Statement-of-Adam-Wagner.pdf 
181 Lord Neuberger, 'No Judgment – No Justice', paper presented at The First Annual BAILII Lecture, Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Fleet Street, London, on 21 November 2012. Paragraph 56. 
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A proponent of open judgments argued that they served wider audiences than lawyers, journalists and 
academics - pointing to the recent example of Ian McEwan’s novel The Children Act.182 McEwan is said to 
have been inspired to write the book by reading family court cases183.  Whilst this might sound like a 
‘frivolous’ example, literature is an important form of public engagement with the law.   
Not all participants, however, took the view that judgments should be aimed at a wider audience than 
litigants and specialists.  There was concern that the media becomes the ‘audience’ for the judgment, when 
the primary audience should be the parties and the specialists.  A discussion arose as to whether judgments 
should be published if they did not establish any new legal principles.  One lawyer said that they were not 
persuaded that mass publication of CoP judgments served a public education purpose since most did not 
contain legal argument or reasoning, but simply applied established legal principles to a particular case.  This 
participant maintained that cases that are important and educative are those which establish new legal 
principles (which were said to be few and far between) or where legal principles were applied to new areas – 
such as sterilisation.  Cases that did not fall into these categories were described as ‘nosing about in people’s 
lives’.184  To this point of a view, a judge responded that legal education should not be confused with legal 
precedent. 
Sometimes cases in the CoP or the family court may concern issues that are also being examined in criminal 
proceedings.  For example, if a relative is being prosecuted for a serious offence against the person the case 
is about and the CoP proceedings are about their welfare in relation to that person.  In such circumstances, 
the CoP may need to arrive at a determination of a welfare matter, but publishing the full details of their 
findings and reasoning may risk prejudicing ongoing criminal proceedings.185  A journalist commented that in 
such circumstances, cases sometimes might have two separate judgments, one published and one not, 
because of the need to keep confidential some of the reasoning relating to any ongoing criminal 
proceedings. 
The importance of privacy 
Whilst all participants agreed that transparency was important, several expressed concern about the privacy 
of parties to cases – both in relation to media reporting and attendance, and the concerns about the 
publication of judgments discussed above.   One researcher highlighted that people are not usually ‘willing’ 
parties to CoP proceedings, and that academic researchers would not be permitted to use personal data in 
this way without their consent.  Or as one lawyer put it, the relevant person ‘hasn’t chosen to bring the 
litigation – or to fight rather than to concede’.  They also commented that there may be different 
considerations in favour of publicity or privacy in non-contentious property and affairs cases, which form the 
vast majority of Court of Protection cases. 
Journalists and those working in the media were aware of a number of cases where families and parties to 
cases welcomed publicity – citing, for example, the case of Steven and Mark Neary.  However, lawyers also 
described cases where families had been very distressed by publicity.  In W v M186, discussed in Appendix 2 
below, the family found media interest in the case very distressing.  One lawyer felt that a ‘media circus’ 
                                                          
182 I McEwan, The Children Act, (Jonathan Cape, London 2014). 
183 I McEwan, 'The law versus religious belief', The Guardian, (London 5 September 2014) 
184 This view was not extensively debated.  A contrary view has been expressed in the past by Sir James Munby, who 
has written that ‘Releasing for publication only those judgments which are 'reportable' means that the public obtains a 
seriously skewed impression of the system’. Lord Justice Munby 'Lost opportunities: law reform and transparency in the 
family courts', (2010) Child and Family Law Quarterly 273. 
185 For information about the law governing reporting of criminal proceedings, see: Judicial College, Reporting 
Restrictions in the Criminal Courts (London 2014). 
186 [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam) 
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could place families under ‘unbearable pressure’, and can mean that everyone loses sight of what matters, 
which is the best interests of the person.   
A number of participants expressed concern at the level of detail about people’s private lives contained in 
some judgments.  A researcher observed that such comprehensive reporting was a feature of common law 
jurisdictions and contrasted this with judgments in civil code traditions, commenting that ‘It is possible to be 
a lot more boring than an English judge’.  Lawyers with experience of representing families in CoP cases 
commented that ‘almost without exception’ families find it an invasion of privacy for lawyers to read about 
their private lives, let alone the general public.  Cases can involve very personal matters, for example they 
might concern sexual relationships between a person’s parents, and in such circumstances the proceedings 
alone are already a significant invasion of privacy.  In some cases the person at the heart of the proceedings 
may have no concept of invasion of privacy, but several participants highlighted that almost nothing was 
known about the impact of publishing a judgment on the person who is subject to the proceedings and 
others involved in the case.   
Even where reporting restrictions are used, this may not offer ‘watertight’ guarantees of privacy.  A 
participant described a case where a family made an application to bring welfare proceedings and far-
reaching reporting restrictions were imposed.  Nevertheless, the neighbours of the family were able to 
identify them from the facts of the case – they alerted the local media and a journalist arrived at their house 
and tried to get in.  This was extremely distressing for the family.  Journalists who attended the roundtable 
were troubled by this ‘doorstepping’ incident, and one expressed concern about inexperienced reporters 
who were used to the criminal courts and reporting on ‘bad people’.  In the CoP, they commented, ‘nobody 
wears a black hat’, the situation is much more delicate and the parties much more vulnerable; they felt that 
younger reporters may not be aware of that. 
Participants discussed a series of recent and highly publicised cases concerning pregnant women and 
childbirth.187  One participant commented on how ‘existentially distressing’ it would be to find an account of 
your experience of childbirth in law reports.  A lawyer with experience of a case concerning involuntary 
treatment of a person with mental health problems described how carefully they had to proceed to ensure 
that any court reporting did not have an adverse impact on them.  A journalist commented that not many 
journalists think about what happens to the person themselves if they find out about the reporting of the 
proceedings.  One participant asked, however, whether it mattered if a person ‘in Newcastle’ has 
information about a person ‘in London’ who is not aware of this.   
A researcher commented that more empirical research was needed on the impact of judgment publication 
on the affected parties.  There was no equivalent in the CoP to research in the family court on the views of 
children about media reporting and publication of judgments.188 
ANONYMISATION 
Discussions explored issues around the anonymity of the people whom the case was about, the other parties 
and witnesses in both media reports and published judgments.  One lawyer helpfully identified different 
‘levels’ of anonymisation, ranging from decisions about whether or not to identify the individual at the heart 
of the case, identifying their relatives, identifying any public bodies or providers involved in their care, 
                                                          
187 These include: Re AA [2012] EWHC 4378 (Court of Protection); Re P [2013] EWHC 4037 (Fam); Re P [2013] EWHC 
4581 (COP); Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v AA & Ors (Rev 1) [2014] EWHC 132 (Fam); North Somerset 
Council v LW & Ors [2014] EWCOP 3; The Mental Health and the Acute Trust v DD & Anor [2014] EWCOP 8; The Mental 
Health Trust & Anor v DD & Anor [2014] EWCOP 11; The Mental Health Trust & Ors v DD & Anor [2014] EWCOP 13; NHS 
Trust & Ors v FG (Rev 1) [2014] EWCOP 30; Re DM [2014] EWHC 3119 (Fam) 
188 J Brophy, The views of children and young people regarding media access to family courts,  (The Children’s 
Commissioner for England, London 2010); J Brophy, K Perry, A Prescott and C Renouf, Safeguarding, Privacy and 
Respect for Children and Young People: The Next Steps in Media Access to Family Courts,  (National Youth Advocacy 
Service and Association of Lawyers for Children, 2014). 
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identifying individual professionals, or ‘blanket’ restrictions on any information being published which 
identifies any persons or organisations involved in the case.  Different issues were raised by different ‘levels’ 
of anonymisation. 
Naming the relevant person and their family 
The point was made by a media representative that without identifying individuals in some cases, the wider 
impact of their case would have been reduced.  The media want to report ‘colour and facts’.; the difficulty 
with removing identifying information from a judgment is that it gives the case less ‘colour’, and it is less 
likely that they will pick up on the case and report it, and therefore the less likely the public would hear 
those stories.   
The case of Mark and Steven Neary was referred to as an example of a situation where identifying the 
individuals concerned had enhanced the positive impact of the ruling.  The case of Ashya King was another, 
rare, example of when the subject of the proceedings was identified – it was said that nobody argued about 
whether this should occur in this case.   
However, it was suggested by a lawyer that the relevant person should be identified only very rarely.  
Another participant suggested that anonymised published judgments may inhibit ‘reportability’, but may still 
hold social value.  It was suggested that identifying relatives could be very distressing, and could deter them 
from bringing an application at all.   
From a historical point of view, it was observed that in the 19th century the practice was to report the full 
names and addresses of those subject to Chancery lunacy proceedings, and often to report the proceedings 
in full.  It was observed that at the present time, a lot of personal details are published in personal injury 
claims.  Subsequent to the roundtable, however, the Court of Appeal ruled that limited derogations from the 
principle of open justice may be lawful in some personal injury cases ‘to enable the court to do justice to the 
claimant and his or her family by ensuring respect for their family and private lives’.189 
The risk of ‘jigsaw identification’ 
It was pointed out that ‘jigsaw identification’ was sometimes possible, even with very wide reporting 
restrictions, because a person’s circumstances as described by the media or in a judgment were so unique.  
This was not said as an argument that cases should not be reported, rather that even with ‘watertight’ 
reporting restrictions ‘there is a price to be paid’. 
Lawyers and judges with experience of the CoP highlighted a tension between including enough information 
in a published judgment to make plain the reasoning of the judge, whilst protecting the privacy of litigants.  
Concerns were expressed that because of the level of detail in some judgments it might be possible for those 
who are familiar with the relevant person to identify who they are.  Two lawyers said they had been involved 
in cases where the information about the facts in a published judgment was significantly cut down to 
minimise ongoing upset to the people involved in the case.  A journalist agreed that too much information 
could be included in judgments – they highlighted a specific recent case where they felt the judgment had 
gone into too much detail.  They had chosen not to report the case out of concern that local people could 
identify the parties.   They argued that there was a need for the courts to restrict the publication of 
information that could be used to ‘triangulate’ the identities of the individuals concerned.   
Whereas the media prefer to identify individuals if possible, researchers tend not to want to do so, and take 
precautions to avoid publishing any information which could contribute to ‘jigsaw identification’.  This is 
because research tends to report on general themes in people’s accounts, rather than a single account.  
Research will therefore tend to present less of a threat to anonymity than individual published judgments or 
media reports.  Yet research on the CoP can present even more technical challenges that media reporting. 
                                                          
189 MX v Dartford & Gravesham NHS Trust & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 96,s §31 
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Identifying public authorities and professionals 
The new guidance on transparency, discussed above, says that the ’starting point’ should be that public 
authorities and professionals should not be granted anonymity by the court.  One participant pointed out 
that factual details such as identifying professionals can narrow down the location of the parties, and may 
contain data which help to ‘triangulate’ their identity.  Identifying the NHS Trust which provides a person’s 
care some sometimes increase the likelihood that a person will be identified if other people in the hospital 
‘make it their business’ to identify the patient.190  
A lawyer who had acted for an NHS Trust pointed to instances where the media had published allegations 
about a named NHS Trust that had already been contradicted by published judgments.  They noted that NHS 
Trusts tended not to respond to incorrect claims – which the media then interpret as ‘if it wasn’t true, then 
you’d put out a statement contradicting it’.   
In some cases Trusts may find themselves at the centre of a ‘media frenzy’ and are not property resourced 
to deal with press inquiries.  This can impact upon the care that they can give. In a blog post the CEO of the 
University Hospital Southampton, where Ashya King had been treated, described the impact of the case: 
Our switchboard and patient support services were overwhelmed with calls from irate 
members of the public. Our security team were busy trying to manage multiple camera 
crews and satellite vans, the clinical site team were attempting to maintain control of the 
situation alongside all the usual challenges of bed availability and our press team were 
besieged by the media, whilst trying to make measured judgements about how to respond 
to this unprecedented situation. 
And many other people working here were being questioned by patients or the public about 
this situation, sometimes in a very aggressive way. 
But through all of this we still had thousands of patients who needed care and treatment. 191 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY FOR DIFFERENT KINDS OF 
CASE 
As discussed earlier, there are different rules governing media access to hearings in the CoP and the family 
court, and between different kinds of CoP case.  In the Family Court, the media are generally permitted to 
attend hearings without having to make a formal application, but in the CoP they must make an application 
to attend any hearings heard in private.  In serious medical treatment cases, the CoP generally sits in public, 
meaning that the media can attend without making an application.  However, this is not the case for other 
kinds of welfare matters – for example, many cases concerning the deprivation of liberty safeguards or a 
person’s capacity to consent to marriage would not be covered. 
Participants were critical of the differences between the access regimes.  A lawyer questioned what 
principled or practical difference there was between these different types of case, and could not see why 
this distinction was made.  They could not see why the privacy of children in the Family Court should be 
treated differently to an adult in the CoP, nor why medical cases were treated different to welfare cases. 
However, other participants expressed concern that the CoP was becoming ‘subsumed’ into the Family 
Court, despite important differences.  In particular, there was concern that the President had initially 
                                                          
190 For an example of concerns like this arising in case law, see NHS Trust & Ors v FG (Rev 1) [2014] EWCOP 30 §67-9, 
where there was concern that if the judgment in this case was published, FG’s fellow patients in hospital might 
recognise her and discuss her and this could lead to a deterioration in her mental health. 
191 F Dalton, 'Chief executive's blog' (9 September 2014), 
http://www.uhs.nhs.uk/AboutTheTrust/Newsandpublications/Chief-executives-blog/Chief-executives-blog-9-
September-2014.aspx 
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intended to draft guidance on transparency that covered both courts.  It was argued that a separate 
consultation was needed on media attendance in the CoP, as it raised different issues to the Family Court. 
When asked by the chair of the discussion whether people felt that the default position in the CoP should be 
that journalists should be able to attend court without making an application, on the same basis as they are 
in the family court, there was unanimous approval of that proposition. 
THE NEW TRANSPARENCY GUIDANCE 
Some participants felt that the new guidance on the publication of judgments, and forthcoming guidance 
which was anticipated to recommend more public hearings and increasing media attendance, was ‘definitely 
a good thing’.  Yet others expressed misgivings.  One described the current approach to transparency as 
‘unprincipled and incoherent’.  They suggested that there needed to be more guidelines for judges in how to 
exercise their discretion under the guidance. 
There was also felt to be a need to address practical and administrative issues (discussed below), as well as 
issuing guidance.  Some participants questioned whether the transparency guidance was being complied 
with in practice, and highlighted the difficulty of knowing whether or not it was without accurate recording 
of when judgments were and were not being published in relation to cases falling within the scope of the 
new transparency guidance.192 
It was also highlighted that the new practice guidance on transparency in relation to the publication of 
judgments does not appear to protect the identity of friend, even a close friend, of the relevant person, who 
may be involved in making the application. 
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 
A recurring theme in discussions at the roundtable was the practical challenges for realizing various forms of 
transparency.   
Judgments 
One participant said that there is a need to address administrative and IT issues in the publication of 
judgments, and not merely legal and ethical issues.  They proposed that experts should liaise with the 
government as it develops new IT systems and CoP online resources.  A shortcoming of the current system 
was said to be the absence of accurate records to see whether the transparency guidance on the publication 
of judgments was being complied with. 
                                                          
192 Since the roundtable, in Justice for Families Ltd v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWCA Civ 1477, the President 
of the Family Division and the CoP rejected an application for a writ of habeas corpus by John Hemming MP in respect 
of a woman whose name he did know, describing the application as ‘hopeless’.  However, during the course of the case 
John Hemming MP drew the Court of Appeal’s attention to a discrepancy between the number of committal cases 
reported by official Ministry of Justice statistics and the number of judgments appearing on BAILII.  Sir James Munby P 
stated: 
The latest figures from the Ministry of Justice of receptions into prison for contempt of court, show that in the 
twelve months from April 2013 to March 2014, a total of 116 contemnors arrived in prison (monthly totals 15, 
11, 8, 13, 14, 7, 12, 7, 6, 8, 7, 8). These figures are broken down into County Court (aggregate total 36), Crown 
Court (5), Magistrates (4), High Court (5) and "Not recorded" (66). Mr Hemming's point, which appears to be 
borne out by an analysis he has conducted for us of the committal cases which appear on BAILII, is that for a 
very large number of these committals there is no judgment to be found on BAILII. This, if true, and every 
indication is that unhappily it is true, is a very concerning state of affairs. (§44) 
Sir James Munby P drew the attention of judges sitting in the Family Court to the Practice Guidance issued in relation to 
committal proceedings (discussed above). 
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Another participant, whilst praising BAILII’s work in general, highlighted some of its limitations.  There were 
some BAILII judgments where people’s names had slipped in.193  They were aware of a family court decision 
where the judge had explicitly written that they wanted publicity, but the case could not be found on BAILII 
so could not be cited.  This is likely to represent a problem with the courts sending the judgments to BAILII, 
rather than BAILII themselves.  There was also concern that interim decisions made by a district judge 
reported on BAILII had misled social workers who did not realise that this did not carry precedent.194 
There were also practical challenges concerning transparency for judgments that are given ex tempore as 
they need to be transcribed, although some judges preferred to always give a written judgment for the 
parties. 
Media attendance and reporting on cases 
A number of practical – and legal – difficulties for media attendance and reporting on CoP cases were 
discussed.   
A general concern was that there were large discrepancies in approach towards media attendance and 
reporting between individual judges.  Particular concerns were expressed by participants from the media 
about judges in regional courts, who might have less experience of media applications to attend and report 
on CoP cases. 
A key concern was how the media could, or should, learn about a case in the CoP.  As discussed earlier, it 
may be a contempt of court under s12 AJA to disclose certain information about proceedings heard in 
private, or where there are reporting restrictions prohibiting discussion of a case.  A question which recurred 
throughout the discussions was whether or not a person may be in contempt of court if they informed the 
media about a case.   
One participant who had considerable experience of applying on behalf of media organisations to attend 
and report on proceedings in the CoP argued that it could be lawful for a person to inform the media about 
their case.  They argued that any blanket prohibition on informing the media would impair their rights under 
Article 10 of the ECHR.  They cited, by way of analogy, the following passage from guidance written by Adam 
Wolanski and Kate Wilson, published by the President of the Family Division (then Sir Nicholas Wall), the 
Judicial College and the Society of Editors: 
Note, however, that FPR 2010 r.12.75(1)(d) uses the phrase “to make and pursue a 
complaint…..” In Re N (Family Proceedings: Disclosure) [2009] EWHC 1663 (Fam)]… at [58] to 
[62], Munby J (as he then was) suggested that the word “complaint” might have a wider 
meaning and be sufficiently broad as not to be confined to complaints made to disciplinary 
or regulatory bodies. The case itself concerned a “complaint” to the GMC, which was plainly 
within the rule, and the judge was at pains to say that the meaning of the crucial word 
“complaint” would have to be elucidated on a case by case basis.195 
This statement relates to an earlier passage196 discussing an exemption under the Family Procedure Rules 
(rule 12.75) where the authors stated that ‘a party may… be able to make disclosures to a journalist if this is 
necessary to enable that party to make a complaint against a person or body concerned in the proceedings 
                                                          
193 It should be noted that BAILII do not perform the screening of judgments for anonymisation, but expect that this has 
taken place before it is sent to them.  BAILII do remove personal information that has been left in judgments very 
swiftly when alerted to this.   
194 See also, regarding problems with media use of BAILII: P Magrath, S Phillimore and J Doughty ‘Transparency: the 
curious case of the judge with no name’ Family Law (forthcoming April 2015)  
195 A Wolanski and K Wilson, The Family Courts: Media Access & Reporting. July 2011 (President of the Family Division, 
Judicial College and the Society of Editors 2011).  Footnote 173, page 36 
196 At paragraph 40 
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or regarding the law, policy or procedure relating to private family proceedings’.  The exemption permitting 
parties to disclose information about proceedings to others for the purpose of making a complaint, even 
construed sufficiently broadly to include speaking to the media, would not, however, apply to the CoP as this 
is governed by the Court of Protection Rules 2007 not the Family Procedure Rules.   
Lawyers who acted for parties in the CoP, however, felt less confident that it was lawful if they, or any party, 
disclosed information about proceedings to the media.  Their view was that at face value there was no lawful 
mechanism for informing the media about a genuinely important case without making an application to the 
court to inform the judge.  They felt this was disproportionate, and that there needed to be a proper 
mechanism for drawing the media’s attention to the case.  They stated that the legal profession was very 
anxious about its role and responsibilities in informing the media.   
Participants with experience of making applications for media attendance and reporting on cases pointed 
out that if it were unlawful to disclose the case number and sufficient information about a case to show 
‘good reason’ for the media to attend, they would be revealing unlawful activity in their applications.  To 
date, nobody has been in trouble for this and so the issue has not been tested in court.  A judge highlighted 
the case of Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post197, commenting that s12 AJA does not prevent the publication of 
the name of the person and therefore citing their name in making an application.198  Another participant 
pointed out that in Re B (A Child)199 a solicitor had got into trouble for alerting MPs to family court 
proceedings, and there was no precedent that it is permissible for a solicitor to alert the media.200 
The participants also discussed who, if anyone, should alert the media to an important case.  A lawyer 
commented that it typically required a family to do so as the Official Solicitor (who acts as a litigation friend 
for the relevant person in many CoP cases) would be unlikely to actively seek press involvement.  They said 
that unless there happened to be a family member who wanted the press involved, these cases will not be 
brought to the attention of the media.   
Some journalists had experience of judges who they felt were very good at notifying them of important 
cases.  One described a judge who would alert them to an important case, allow them to attend and then 
discuss at the end what could be reported when the media knew what they wanted to report.  They felt that 
this was a good system.  They commented, however, that emergency applications – like recent cases 
concerning emergency interventions regarding childbirth – were more problematic.  They asked how the 
media should know that the court is sitting in emergency hearings, especially if these cases were heard out 
of hours. 
In some cases which are heard in open court, the media may learn of a case via the CopyDirect notification 
service (discussed above) giving them notice of reporting restrictions.  The CopyDirect notice usually arrives 
the night before, but there have been cases where it has arrived whilst the hearing is already underway.  
One journalist had received notice of a case three hours after the hearing had finished.  Typically if the 
media learns of a case in this way, only those journalists who are based in the courts would be able to attend 
at such short notice. It would be impossible for anyone to attend at minus three hours’ notice. 
                                                          
197 [1991] 2 A.C. 370 
198 In the Pickering case, the House of Lords held that s12 AJA did not make it a contempt of court for the media to 
publish the fact that a named patient had applied for their release from detention to a mental health tribunal, nor the 
fact that he had been discharged.   However, publishing the evidential basis for the Tribunal’s decision, and any 
conditions imposed on discharge, was prohibited by the Tribunal rules. 
199 [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam) 
200 See Re B, p. 13 above, where both a mother who believed herself the victim of an injustice in the family courts and 
her solicitor had both gone to MPs. They were criticised by Munby J (as he then was) for having ‘disseminated 
documents containing information within the ambit of section 12 of the 1960 Act’ (§149).   
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The discussion turned to whether the court listings themselves could give some kind of indication to the 
media of the subject matter of the case, so that they could decide whether or not to make an application to 
attend the hearing.  One participant likened the current court listings system, where cases are typically listed 
as ‘In the Matter of P’, as being like football match fixtures listed as ‘P v P’ and ‘P v P’.  A representative of 
the media argued that cases should be listed with a case number and an indication of what the case is about 
– its approximate subject matter.  A journalist pointed to the system in the family court, where the listings 
used a ‘code’ which gave some indication of what the case is about; for example, a case listed with a ‘D’ was 
a divorce case.  The President is currently working on a more refined listing system in the family court in 
order to assist the media.201   
Informative listings were said to be more challenging in the CoP where, for example, cases involving LPAs 
might also involve many other substantive issues.  It would have to be a more complex classification system.  
It was suggested that if we want to enhance public understanding of the work of the CoP what was needed 
was more than a code; it needed somebody to highlight which cases were ‘interesting’ and which were not.  
Lawyers had experience of reporters being invited in to listen to a case which they felt was ‘boring’, and 
which lasted for five days.  There are cases that are ‘unbelievably important’, but who is going to distinguish 
between ‘serious medical treatment’ and ‘serious medical treatment three stars’ cases? 
Sometimes the media learned of cases because a judgment had been placed on BAILII.  One participant 
estimated that as many as seven or eight CoP judgments published on BAILII had been picked up by the 
press.  
Reporting restrictions and the CopyDirect service 
Under section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), when any court is considering granting any relief 
which may affect the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, all practicable steps must be taken to 
notify those whose rights will be restricted, or else there must be compelling reasons why they should not 
be notified.  Practice Direction 13A (reproduced here in Appendix 3) describes the procedure for notifying 
the media of an application for reporting restrictions in CoP cases.  It advises that notice should be served on 
the media via the CopyDirect service, to which national newspapers and broadcasters subscribe,202 and gives 
details on how to do this.  One of the requirements of the Practice Direction is that any applications for 
reporting restrictions of which the media are notified should be accompanied by an explanatory note ‘from 
which persons served can readily understand the nature of the case’203. 
During the roundtable, some representatives of the media argued that this system was unsatisfactory.  
There was the difficulty, discussed above, of notification being effected without sufficient time for the media 
to attend a hearing.  One representative of the media described experiences of reporting restrictions being 
circulated by local authorities without an explanatory note, or with an explanatory note that is password 
protected but without any password.  They also expressed concern that the ‘vast majority’ of legal advisors 
were not serving notice of the orders imposing reporting restriction on media organisations; they were 
receiving notice of the application, but not the final order.  This was said to be potentially dangerous, as not 
all media organisations would circulate the notice of application to impose reporting restrictions, as this is 
only an application and not an order, and so if any orders were imposed media organisations might not be 
aware of them.   
                                                          
201 Sir James Munby, 'Transparency - The Next Steps: A Consultation Paper issued by the President of the Family 
Division on 15 August 2014', Family Law, available: http://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/transparency-
the-next-steps-a-consultation-paper-issued-by-the-president-of-the-family-division-on-15-august-2014 
202 Practice Direction 13A, paragraph 13. 
203 Practice Direction 13A, paragraph 16. 
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Lawyers present pointed out that the requirement to serve the media with notice of the order, as well as the 
application, is contained in the Practice Direction204 and should be stated in the orders.  It may be stated in 
the orders, however closer scrutiny of Practice Direction 13A after the roundtable revealed that whilst it 
does give extensive guidance on serving notice via CopyDirect for applications for reporting restrictions, or 
where the court is considering an own-initiative order imposing reporting restrictions, it does not explicitly 
state that the orders themselves must be served on the media.   
The cost of applying to attend a hearing and report on a case 
Representatives of the media argued that the current process for applying to attend a hearing and reporting 
on a case could be costly, and this could have a chilling effect on reporting CoP cases.  An example was given 
of a case where a media organisation made a very costly application to attend a hearing, a journalist 
consequently spent several days in court, only for reporting restrictions to prohibit them from publishing any 
information about the hearing.  Cost was less of a concern in the Family Court, where the media did not 
need to make an application to attend a hearing.   
One representative of the media expressed concern that the adverse costs ruling in Re G (Adult)205 could 
have a chilling effect, albeit they felt that it was probably not appropriate for the media to apply to be a 
party in the case (this case is described in Appendix 2). 
It was suggested that any chilling effect arising from the cost of making an application would be felt more 
keenly by smaller media organisations.  As a result of this, it would increasingly be only well-resourced media 
organisations who could afford to make an application to attend and report on a CoP hearing.   
Research in the Court of Protection  
The roundtable also included a brief discussion of some of the ‘transparency’ challenges facing researchers 
in the CoP.  These challenges came from the multiple layers of regulation of research in this area.  
Researchers hoping to conduct research on CoP hearings, files or with litigants will need, at the very least, 
authorisation from their university Research Ethics Committee (REC) and the Ministry of Justice’s Data 
Access Panel.  Whilst these processes contained some quite detailed and challenging requirements, they 
were also experienced as useful in producing more focussed research and the Ministry of Justice Data Access 
Panel process was experienced as broadly supportive and helpful.   
However, until the 2015 amendments to the Court of Protection Rules the ‘automatic’ reporting restrictions 
imposed by s12 AJA presented a very serious difficulty to researchers, as it meant that researchers would 
need an order in each and every case where they sought to observe a hearing, speak with somebody about a 
case they were involved in, or consult a court file.  This could impose a very arduous process on researchers 
and court staff alike.  It was suggested at the roundtable that a rule change and practice direction similar to 
that adopted by the family court would be beneficial for facilitating research on the CoP.  Following the 
roundtable, as discussed above, a rule change was introduced which allows the adoption of a similar practice 
direction in the Court of Protection (see Practice Direction 13A in Appendix 3). 
Even setting aside the difficulties posed by s12 AJA, however, research in the CoP would still be challenging, 
especially if researchers sought to use data that would ordinarily require the person’s consent where 
participants lack the mental capacity to consent to its use.  This is because under the MCA, they would need 
to invoke special procedural safeguards and also seek authorisation from a specialist Research Ethics 
Committee which had authorisation from the Secretary of State.  Some researchers working in this area 
described difficulty obtaining the requisite authorisation.  Approval from the Ministry of Justice Data Access 
Panel would also be required. 
                                                          
204 Practice Direction 13A, at paragraph 
205 [2014] EWCOP 5 
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There is also a danger that different bodies from whom authorisation must be sought might impose 
conflicting requirements, or requirements which meant that a researcher could end up going back and forth 
between different bodies in order to ensure that adjustments required by one body were agreed by the 
other bodies from whom authorisation must be sought.   
In a discussion of the challenges posed by the MCA itself in conducting research on litigants in the CoP who 
may lack the mental capacity to consent to participate in a research project, it was suggested by one 
participant that research involving people who have the mental capacity to consent to participate would be 
a possibility, even in the CoP, as mental capacity is ‘decision specific’ and can fluctuate.  This means that they 
may be able to consent to participate in a research project about their experiences of the court even if their 
capacity to make a particular decision has been questioned in the past. 
The difficulties of navigating multiple layers of regulation in research on the CoP will form the focus of a 
future publication, offering practical guidance to researchers working in this area.   
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DISCUSSION 
The roundtable brought together participants from a range of backgrounds, with different perspectives on 
‘transparency’ issues in the CoP.  Despite these differing backgrounds and perspectives, there was 
considerable common ground among the participants.   
All participants agreed that it was important that the media were able to report on CoP cases and that 
judgments were published.  However, there was disagreement among participants about which cases the 
media should be able to report, or which judgments should be published, and what level of detail about 
these cases that should be in the public domain.  There was a tension between ensuring there was enough 
detail concerning the facts of the case to make the judge’s reasoning clear, or to provide the media with 
sufficient ‘colour’ to report a case, and protecting the privacy of the individuals concerned.  It was suggested 
that guarantees of anonymity could never be absolute, even with ‘watertight’ reporting restrictions, and that 
even if a person was not identified by third parties, reading about oneself in a report of a case could be 
‘existentially distressing’.  One participant commented that whilst transparency is important, ‘there is a price 
to be paid’. 
Several themes recurred through the discussions.  One was the absence of research or robust evidence to 
support both claims made in favour of greater ‘transparency’ or a greater emphasis on privacy.  For example, 
it was argued that transparency could help to protect against miscarriages of justice and protect against 
judicial ‘misbehaviour’, but there was no research basis for this claim.  Meanwhile, it was acknowledged that 
there was no research on how litigants in the CoP felt about their cases being publicly reported.  A third area 
where it was felt that more research was needed was the ‘audience’ for published judgments on BAILII, so 
that more could be known about who uses published judgments and what they would find useful. 
Another recurring theme was that whilst it is important to consider the principles of transparency and 
privacy, it is also important to focus on the practical and administrative matters which facilitate media 
reporting and the publication of judgments.  In particular, there was concern that the process for ensuring 
that judgments are published on BAILII in accordance with the new transparency guidance was insufficiently 
robust.   
A key difficulty for the media was knowing when an important case was occurring; there was a lack of clarity 
over who could lawfully inform them of proceedings.  It was suggested that the court listings could be 
adapted to contain more information about the subject matter of the case.  Media representatives also 
expressed concern about the cost of applying to attend a hearing, saying that this could have a chilling 
effect.  Participants at the roundtable supported a change in the CoP rules to permit members of the media 
to attend a hearing without making an application, as they are in public law cases in the family court.  Media 
representatives also expressed concern that they were not always being served with notice of applications 
for reporting restrictions in good time, and in some cases were not being given notice of orders imposing 
reporting restrictions at all. 
On the basis of these discussions, we have identified the following issues for further exploration: 
1. Consideration should be given to whether the court should adopt a rule change to permit the media 
to attend important welfare hearings, as well as serious medical treatment cases; 
2. Consideration should be given to how to improve the system for informing the media of important 
CoP cases; 
3. There is a need for greater legal clarity about when parties and legal representatives can lawfully 
inform the media about a case; 
4. Practice Direction 13A may need to be updated to remind the parties of the need to notify the 
media of any order imposing reporting restrictions, in addition to notifying them of any application 
for reporting restrictions; 
5. When judgments by district or circuit judges are published on BAILII, it may be useful to include a 
note that the judgment does not establish any legal precedent; 
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6. The court, or researchers, should explore ways to collect statistics on how effectively the 
transparency guidance on the publication of judgments is being complied with: how many 
judgments meeting the criteria for publication under the new guidance are, and are not, being 
published? 
7. More research is needed on: the views of litigants about media reporting on CoP cases and the 
publication of judgments; the users of published judgments and their information and access needs; 
the effect of ‘transparency’ on the behaviour of the judiciary and other actors within the legal 
system. 
 
 
  
 47 
 
APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF THE LAW 
A more detailed description of the legal framework governing transparency and privacy issues in the Court 
of Protection is given in the body of this report.  However, the key elements of this legal framework can be 
summarised as follows: 
- Where proceedings of the CoP are held in private, section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 
1960 (AJA) means that it may be a contempt of court to publish any information about the 
proceedings. 
- In Re B (A Child)206 Munby J (as he then was) interpreted ‘publication’ of information very broadly, 
and as including not just information communicated to the media but also private communications 
to individuals207. 
- Unlike the family court, there are not ‘automatic’ restraints on identifying the individuals involved in 
CoP proceedings, but the court may make an order208 imposing reporting restrictions on publishing 
the identity of the individuals or information relating to the proceedings.  The media must be 
notified of any applications for reporting restrictions209, but if they use this information for editorial 
purposes before an order is made this would be a contempt of court.210 
- The case of Re B raised questions about whether litigants were permitted to disclose information 
about proceedings to third parties such as their MP, other family members, or professionals such as 
their doctor or counsellors who might be involved in supporting them.  In response, a rule change 
and practice direction was adopted which permits disclosure of information for certain purposes to 
specified individuals.  This practice direction also permits the disclosure of information to 
researchers for authorised research projects.  There is no equivalent rule or practice direction in the 
CoP. 
- The general rule is that CoP hearings are heard in private211, meaning that the restrictions of s12 AJA 
will usually apply and in general the media will need to make an application to attend and report on 
a hearing. Unlike the Family Court, there is no provision allowing media attendance without 
application.212 
- However, the CoP has the power to order that a hearing will be heard in public.213  Where cases are 
heard in public, the court may make orders imposing reporting restrictions.214 
- Practice Direction 9E states that ‘ordinarily’ serious medical treatment cases will be heard in 
public.215  This does not apply to wider ‘welfare’ issues, for example disputes over a where a person 
should live or whether they should have contact with their family. 
- When the court hears an application for committal for contempt of court, the general rule is that the 
hearing will be in public.  If the committal hearing is held in private the court must state publicly the 
                                                          
206 [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam)  
207 §68 
208 Under Court of Protection Rules 2007 rule 91 
209 s12 Human Rights Act 1998 
210 A Healthcare NHS Trust v P & Q [2015] EWCOP 15; Contempt of Court Act 1981. 
211 Court of Protection Rules 2007 rule 90 
212 Family Procedure Rules 2010 r 27.11(2)(f) 
213 Court of Protection Rules 2007 rule 92 
214 Court of Protection Rules 2007 rule 91 
215 Court of Protection, Practice Direction 9E - Applications relating to serious medical treatment,  (Judiciary of England 
and Wales, London 2007) 
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name of the person to whom the committal application relates, ‘in general terms the nature of the 
contempt in respect of which the order of committal is being made’ and any punishment imposed.216  
Recently the President of the CoP, Sir James Munby, issued practice guidance reminding judges and 
practitioners of these rules, and additionally requiring that in every case where a committal order is 
made a transcript of the judgment should be prepared at public expense and placed on the BAILII 
website.217 
- The President has also published practice guidance on the publication of judgments of the CoP.218  
This states that judgments regarding certain types of case – chiefly serious medical treatment cases, 
cases about serious welfare matters and deprivation of liberty, and property and affairs cases 
involving disputes or very high value property decisions – the ‘starting point’ is that the judgment 
should be published and placed on BAILII.  For other types of case, the starting point is that the 
judgment may be published if there is an application from a party or accredited member of the 
media.  
- The President’s guidance on the publication of judgments also states that where a judge gives 
permission for the judgment to be published, public authorities and expert witnesses should be 
named ‘unless there are compelling reasons why they should not be so named’, but the person who 
is the subject of proceedings and their family should not be named. 
- In deciding whether to hold a hearing in public, to allow the media to report on the proceedings, 
whether to impose reporting restrictions or permit information to be published and deciding 
whether or not to publish a judgment, the courts must consider the rights of the parties and the 
media under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (the right to a fair trial), 
Article 8 (the right to respect for home, family and private life) and Article 10 (freedom of 
expression).   
                                                          
216 Court of Protection Rules 2007 rule 188 
217 Committal For Contempt Of Court (Practice Guidance) [2013] EWHC B4 (COP) 2013; Committal For Contempt Of 
Court (Practice Guidance - Supplemental) [2013] EWHC B7 (COP) 2013 
218 Practice Guidance (Transparency in the Court Of Protection) [2014] EWCOP B2 
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APPENDIX 2: KEY CASES ON TRANSPARENCY IN THE COURT OF PROTECTION 
Case and judgments Summary Legal Issues 
E v Channel Four 
Television Corp [2005] 
EWHC 1144 
Judge: Munby J (as he 
then was) 
This High Court case preceded the MCA. On behalf of E, the Official Solicitor sought an 
injunction under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to prevent a film about E 
being broadcast by Channel Four and the publication of an article about her, on the basis 
that public dissemination of intimate personal information about her would cause her 
harm. E had herself consented to the making of this film, but it was asserted that she 
lacked the mental capacity to consent to this. The court was not satisfied that E was 
‘likely’ to lack capacity to consent to the broadcast of the film, and even if it was it was 
not satisfied that it was contrary to her best interests, especially given her own wishes 
and feelings. The court declined to make an injunction restricting the broadcast of the 
film. 
- Use of the inherent 
jurisdiction to restrain 
publication 
- Capacity to consent to 
publicity about one’s 
personal affairs when 
the relevant person 
wants publicity. 
A v Independent News & 
Media Ltd & Ors [2010] 
EWCA Civ 343; [2010] 3 All 
ER 32 
Judges: The Lord Chief 
Justice of England and 
Wales 
(Lord Judge); The Master 
of the Rolls (Lord 
Neuberger) and 
Sir Mark Potter, President 
of the Family Division 
 
(On appeal from Mr 
Justice Hedley in [2009] 
EWHC 2858 (Fam)) 
Derek Paravicini is an accomplished pianist who has disabilities. His parents and sister 
applied to the CoP to be appointed as deputies for his property and affairs. However, the 
Royal National Institute for the Blind, who provided his accommodation, invited the 
court to appoint an independent deputy. The media applied to attend hearings in the 
CoP, citing the common law principle of open justice and their Article 10 ECHR rights. 
This application was opposed by Paravicini’s family and the Official Solicitor, acting on his 
behalf.  
In the High Court, Hedley J found that the media must first show ‘good reason’ why they 
should be permitted to attend, and if that was established then the court should 
consider the balance of Paravicini’s Article 8 rights and the media’s Article 10 rights. He 
held that the media should be allowed to attend hearings and report on materials that 
was already in the public domain and ‘which answers the legitimate questions of a 
reasonable person who knows what is presently within the public domain’. Other 
matters, such as his earnings, care arrangements and medical treatment matters, were 
not reportable. 
Upon appeal, it was held that the CoP starts from the assumption that ‘just as the 
conduct of their lives by adults with the necessary mental capacity is their own affair, so 
- Media attendance of 
CoP hearings and right 
to report on them and 
identity ‘P’ 
- Two-stage criteria for 
applications to attend 
court and report on 
proceedings: ‘good 
reason’ for bringing the 
application must be 
shown, before 
proceeding to the 
balancing exercise 
competing Article 8 and 
Article 10 rights 
- Reporting on matters 
that are already in the 
public domain 
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too the conduct of the affairs of those adults who are incapacitated is private business’. 
The Court of Appeal held that because many aspects of Paravicini’s life were already in 
the public domain, the public and media interest was engaged, and it was an appropriate 
hearing for the media to understand the CoP's processes. After considering the relevant 
case law on Article 10 ECHR rights of the media, the appeal was dismissed. 
- The distinction between 
the public interest and 
matters that the public 
find interesting 
G v E, Manchester City 
Council and F [2010] 
EWHC 2042 
Judge: Baker J 
(See also: G v E, A Local 
Authority & F [2010] 
EWHC 621 (Fam); G v E 
[2010] EWCA Civ 548; G v 
E & Ors [2010] EWCA Civ 
822; G v E [2010] EWHC 
2512 (COP); G v E & Ors 
[2010] EWHC 3385 (Fam)) 
In this long running case, Baker J had found that a local authority had violated E’s Article 
8 ECHR rights to respect for home, family and private life, and had unlawfully deprived 
him of his liberty, when it had moved him from living with his foster mother to 
supported living accommodation on the basis of safeguarding concerns, without any 
formal legal authority to do so ([2010] EWHC 621 (Fam)). Mike Dodd from the press 
Association submitted that this was ‘clearly a case of great public interest, and one which 
should be reported’ and that given the gravity of the errors made by the local authority 
they should be publicly identified so that the public could hold them to account. 
Publication was not opposed by any of the parties; even the local authority ‘ultimately 
accepted that its identification was unavoidable.’ Baker J therefore publicly named 
Manchester City Council as the local authority in the case. 
- Identification of public 
authorities responsible 
for wrongdoing219 
P v Independent Print Ltd. 
& Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 
756 
Judges: Lord Justice Ward, 
Lord Justice Carnwath and 
Lord Justice Tomlinson 
(see also: A Primary Care 
Trust v AH [2008] EWHC 
1403 (Fam); A Primary 
P was the subject of long running welfare proceedings in the CoP concerning where he 
should live and restrictions on contact with his mother. A hearing was fixed for a review 
of his case by Hedley J on 8th December 2010; on 22nd November 2010 The Independent 
newspaper’s legal department emailed the CoP with an application to attend and report 
upon this hearing. The court office did not reply until 7th December, when it stated that 
the media application would be heard before Hedley J immediately before the welfare 
hearing. The Independent’s appearance was said to take the other parties by surprise, 
since the Independent’s email application had not resulted in an application being issued 
by the court which could be served on the parties. Hedley J cautioned against relying 
- Media application to 
attend and report upon 
a case that was not 
already in the public 
domain 
- Procedural fairness in 
media applications to 
attend and report on 
hearings (need for 
proper notice for all 
parties) 
                                                          
219 For an example of a local authority who was found to have violated a couple’s human rights, but who was not identified, see: The Local Authority v Mrs D & Anor [2013] 
EWHC B34 (CoP) 
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Care Trust v P [2009] EW 
Misc 10 (EWCOP)) 
upon email applications and stated that this illustrated that working procedures had not 
yet been fully established for media applications. 
Hedley J found that P’s mother – AH – had been encouraging publicity to increase her 
influence over him, but that since this could be managed via the contact regime this did 
not mean that his Article 8 rights outweighed the media’s Article 10 rights. Hedley J 
commented that in his experience where journalists had attended court, the reporting 
had been fair, accurate and impartial. He made an order permitting media attendance. 
However, he also ordered that AH ‘whether by herself or the instruction or 
encouragement of any other person, shall not, by any means, bring to the attention of 
[P] the fact of, nor the content of, any media reporting of this case’. Expert evidence 
acquired after the hearing held that P was unlikely to identify himself in media 
publications, however if he ‘believes that information about him is being shared with the 
media it will contribute to a sense of distrust. This will seriously undermine his care plan 
and developing therapeutic relationships.’ 
The Court of Appeal heard that the hearing of 8th December was for pressing welfare 
matters. Because the parties were unaware of the Independent’s application, they 
complained that it had been ‘hijacked’. This had incurred costs for the parties. The Court 
of Appeal held that Hedley J had to deal with the matter there and then as to do 
otherwise would be to deny the Independent the privilege they sought, however it also 
held that ‘Their attempts to issue the application were totally inadequate and rightly the 
subject of criticism by the judge’. The Court of Appeal upheld Hedley J’s decision to 
permit the media to attend court. 
- Orders that P should not 
be made aware of 
media coverage of his 
case 
London Borough of 
Hillingdon v Neary & Anor 
(Rev 2) [2011] EWHC 413 
(COP) 
Judge: Jackson J 
(See also: London Borough 
of Hillingdon v Neary & 
Anor [2011] EWHC 1377 
(COP); Re Steven Neary; LB 
Steven Neary was detained by the London Borough of Hillingdon in a care home under 
the DoLS for nearly a year. During this time his father, Mark Neary, began a public 
campaign to ‘Get Steven Home’, which had attracted some media interest. Eventually, 
the DoLS authorisation for Steven’s detention was terminated by Mostyn J in the High 
Court. A future hearing was scheduled to determine whether Hillingdon had acted 
lawfully or violated Steven’s human rights. Five media organisations (Independent Print 
Ltd, Guardian News and Media Ltd, Times Newspapers Ltd, the BBC and the Press 
Association) applied to attend the hearing and report on the case, and to identify the 
parties. The Official Solicitor, on behalf of Steven, argued that the court should take a 
- Media application to 
report a case about 
alleged wrongdoing by a 
public authority and 
identify all the parties, 
including P 
- Significance of the story 
and identities of the 
parties already being in 
the public eye 
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Hillingdon v Steven Neary 
[2011] EWHC 3522 (COP); 
Re Steven Neary; LB 
Hillingdon v Steven Neary 
[2012] MHLO 71 (COP)) 
cautious approach and he could not see further publicity as being in Steven’s best 
interests. 
The media argued that there was good reason for the orders as there was a public 
interest in the work of the CoP, it was alleged that Steven and his father’s rights were 
seriously infringed by a public authority and the issues had already been aired to some 
extent in the public domain. 
Jackson J affirmed the starting point of handling the affairs of incapacitated people 
privately (Independent News and Media v A) but observed that the rules did permit 
public hearings. He observed that publicity can ‘have a strong effect on individuals’, but 
stated that there had to be a ‘proper factual basis’ for these concerns. There was a 
genuine public interest in the CoP's work being understood, in part to dispel 
misunderstandings – it is not in the interests of litigants for the court to be characterized 
as ‘secretive’. Media participation need not be limited to ‘exceptional’ individuals like 
Derek Paravicini. A distinction can be drawn between cases that are already in the public 
eye and those that are not.  Where the proceedings themselves do not ‘create the story’ 
the question is whether an already existing story can be followed in court. Jackson J 
recognized that stories about particular individuals are more attractive to the media 
than stories about unidentified people. But once a person is identified the court’s ability 
to control the information about them is lost. Jackson J authorised the media’s 
attendance in court and the identification of the parties in the case.  
In the subsequent hearing ([2011] EWHC 1377 (COP)), Hillingdon circulated a 
‘contentious and inaccurate’ briefing note to the media to counteract adverse publicity, 
which painted a ‘particularly unfair and negative picture of Steven’. Hillingdon had 
attempted to counteract its effects by informing the media that Jackson J had directed 
that no part of it should be published. Jackson J affirmed that he had given no such 
direction, trusting the media to ‘continue to respect Steven's need to be left in peace, as 
it has done since the hearing in February’. 
- Requirement for a 
proper factual basis for 
claims that publicity 
may have an adverse 
effect on individuals 
- Publicity may enhance 
public understanding of 
the CoP's work and 
dispel 
misunderstandings, 
which is in the public 
interest and the 
interests of litigants 
- Stories about identified 
individuals are more 
attractive to the media 
than unidentified 
individuals, but once 
identified the court’s 
ability to control 
information in the 
public domain about 
them is lost. 
W v M & Ors [2011] EWHC 
1197 (COP) 
Judge: Baker J 
M had been in a minimally conscious state since contracting brain stem encephalitis at 
the age of 43. Her family believed that she would not wish to continue living in her 
present situation. They applied to the CoP for a declaration that it was not in her best 
- Family application to 
restrict publicity 
- Public interest in 
medical cases 
 53 
 
(See also: W v M [2011] 
EWHC 2443 (Fam)) 
interests to continue to receive artificial nutrition and hydration or other life-sustaining 
treatment, and for it to be withdrawn so that she might be allowed to die. 
Baker J directed that all hearings should be in open court, but invited applications for 
injunctions preventing publication of identities. The media were notified of a directions 
hearing and journalists, but not lawyers, from The Times and the Press Association 
attended. The family said that bringing the proceedings had been extremely difficult and 
they would ‘struggle to cope with the possibility of being contacted by the press’.  Being 
contacted or identified by the media might cause them to think twice about bringing the 
case and affect their ability to visit M. Baker J made an order prohibiting publication of 
65 identities, or contact with them by the media, including that of M and her family, and 
people involved in her care. This injunction provoked considerable criticism from the 
media (John Hemming MP was reported as calling this injunction ‘evil’220), however 
media representatives who were served with the order did not object to the 
‘doorstepping’ restrictions, although they did object to the long list of names and 
prohibitions on taking photographs of M when there was no evidence that they would 
do this. 
Baker J reviewed the injunction. He considered the balance of Article 8 rights to privacy 
of M and her family and the Article 10 rights of the media (applying the evidence test in 
Neary). He considered the public interest in medical treatment cases concerning life and 
death decisions. He cautioned practitioners against allowing ‘naturally protective 
instincts’ to underestimate Article 10 rights. He commented that the conduct of the 
balancing exercise of competing ECHR rights was different in the CoP than 
‘superinjunction’ cases in the Queen’s Bench Division. He also considered that Article 6 
rights to a fair trial might weigh against publicity where ‘the publication of information 
relating to proceedings, or attempts by the media to contact litigants, would affect the 
capacity or willingness of a party to participate in the litigation’. A revised injunction 
reduced the number of people who must not be identified or approached, specified that 
restrictions on publication applied to social media such as Twitter and Facebook, but also 
specified those matters not covered by the injunction. 
- Injunctions to prohibit 
‘doorstepping’ 
- Consideration of Article 
6 rights where publicity 
might affect the 
willingness or capacity 
of litigants to bring a 
case 
- Restrictions on 
publication of 
information on social 
media 
                                                          
220 Doughty, S. (2011) 'Judge makes first ever order banning publication of information on Facebook and Twitter to prevent woman in coma from being named', Daily Mail, 
13 May 2011. 
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RB (Adult) (No 4) [2011] 
EWHC 3017 (Fam) 
Judge: Munby LJ 
See also: Re RB 
(Adult) [2010] EWHC 2423 
(Fam), Re RB (Adult) (No 2) 
[2011] EWHC 112 (Fam) 
and Re RB (Adult) (No 3) 
[2011] EWHC 2576 (Fam) 
The local authority began proceedings concerning RB under the inherent jurisdiction 
because of concerns about the behaviour of her partner, MF. The Official Solicitor 
inquired whether a judgment in this case had been released for publication. Munby LJ 
(as he then was) instructed his clerk to reply that he wondered whether it was the case 
that this was a matter for him as s12 AJA does not apply to proceedings under the 
inherent jurisdiction; he sought the views of the parties about publication. Munby LJ 
stated that ‘so far as I am aware, no statutory provision regulating the publication or 
reporting of judgments given or handed down in the Family Division in proceedings 
under the inherent jurisdiction in respect of adults’, unlike proceedings in the CoP. He 
also considered the effect of the ‘rubric’, clarifying that ‘The rubric is not an injunction’ 
and has no penal notice, but that this does not mean it is unenforceable. Munby LJ held 
that it was ‘binding on anyone who seeks to make use of a judgment to which it is 
attached’ and ‘anyone who disobeys it is, in principle, guilty of a contempt of court.’ 
- No automatic reporting 
restrictions on 
proceedings under the 
inherent jurisdiction 
- The ‘rubric’ above a 
judgment restricting the 
publication of 
information about a 
case is not an injunction 
and nor a penal notice. 
However it is 
enforceable as it is 
binding on anybody 
seeking to make use of 
a judgment to which it is 
attached and anybody 
disobeying it is in 
principle guilty of a 
contempt of court. 
Stoke City Council v 
Maddocks [2012] B31 
COP; MHLO 111 (COP) 
Judge: HH Cardinal J 
See also: SCC v LM & Ors 
[2013] EWCOP 1137 
Sometime before 11 December 2012221, the website Mental Health Law Online222 
(MHLO) published an anonymised judgment relating to the committal of Wanda 
Maddocks (WM) for contempt of court. WM’s father, John Maddocks, lived in a care 
home subject to an order of the CoP, as WM had previously removed him and taken him 
to Turkey. Further orders forbade WM from using or threatening violence against her 
father or the care home staff, from intimidating, harassing or pestering her father or any 
employee of the local authority or the home. In contravention of these orders, WM had 
taken her father to see a solicitor, had distributed a leaflet giving details of the case and 
containing a photo of him, and was alleged to have threatened local authority staff and 
left abusive answerphone messages for them. The judgment also detailed how WM had 
- Committal for contempt 
of court for: i) removing 
a person from a care 
home to see a solicitor, 
in contravention of a 
court order; ii) 
distribution of leaflets 
containing information 
about the case and 
identifying the person; 
                                                          
221 The date my reference manager software (Endnote) records my having added the case. 
222 www.mentalhealthlaw.co.uk 
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caused her father to cry. WM had attempted to evade service of notice for the 
application for her committal for contempt. She was eventually served, but did not come 
to the hearing. HH Judge Cardinal ordered that she be sent to prison for a period of five 
months. She was not named in the judgment that was initially published on MHLO. 
The following March, the Daily Mail reported that Maddocks had been ‘Jailed in secret - 
for trying to rescue her father from care home where she believed he would die'.223 The 
article stated that the judge had ruled that she had been jailed when she was not 
present or represented by a lawyer. The article complained that the judge had ‘gone 
through the motions’ of observing open justice by ordering ushers to announce the 
hearing in the corridor, but complained that ‘there was no wider announcement of the 
judgment’. There was extensive coverage of the case by the Daily Mail and the 
Telegraph. Following this coverage, the President issued the practice guidance on 
committals, outlined above. 
iii) harassing local 
authority staff and the 
relevant person in 
contravention of court 
orders. 
- Publication of 
judgments, and 
identification of the 
individual, in committal 
proceedings 
- Case prompted new 
practice guidance for 
transparency in 
committal proceedings 
Re RGS [2012] EWCOP 
4162,  Re RGS (No 2)224 
and Re RGS (No. 3) [2014] 
EWCOP B12 
Judge: Eldergill DJ 
RGS’s son, RBS, felt that RGS was not being adequately cared for in his care home. RBS 
objected to RGS’s deputy’s proposal to sell some of his paintings, including a Pissarro 
worth £20-30,000, to fund RGS’s care, and had contacted the media.  RBS had published 
information about the proceedings in the form of a publicly displayed poster inviting the 
general public to attend the hearing, as well as posting information on social media.  At 
the hearing, he displayed an inconsistent understanding of the nature of the proceedings 
and the consequences of breaching court orders. A question arose as to his litigation 
capacity: if he had litigation capacity, then ‘the counterpart of capacity and autonomy is 
accountability for acts autonomously done’, including potentially prison, fines and costs 
orders for violation of court orders.  If he lacked litigation capacity, then ‘subject to 
certain relatively rare exceptions, taking a punitive approach to someone who is unable 
to comply with litigation rules and directions would be unjust. I would be punishing him 
for something beyond his control or in respect of which his responsibility is clearly 
diminished’ ([2012] EWCOP 4162).  Eldergill DJ concluded that on the evidence available, 
RBS lacked the capacity to conduct this litigation, however he ‘reserved the right’ to take 
- Contempt of court by a 
person who lacks 
litigation capacity: even 
if a person does not 
have an absolute 
defence against 
contempt, ‘taking a 
punitive approach to 
someone who is unable 
to comply with litigation 
rules and directions 
would be unjust’ 
- Refusal to lift reporting 
restrictions although 
                                                          
223 Doughty, S. and Dolan, A. (2013) 'Jailed in secret - for trying to rescue her father from care home where she believed he would die', Daily Mail, 23 April 2013. 
224 The transcript for this can be found as an Appendix to Re RGS (No. 3) [2014] EWCOP B12. 
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action about further breaches of reporting restrictions.  Eldergill DJ considered how to 
balance RBS’s rights to criticize him and the court with RGS’s rights to privacy, and 
concluded that it was in RGS’s best interests to remain anonymous. 
Because of media interest in the case, in Re RGS (No 2), Eldergill DJ published his reasons 
for approving a consent order.  Eldergill DJ stated that the press had worked 
‘constructively’ with the parties,225 and stated that when speaking to RBS he felt sure he 
could rely on them ‘to have regard to his health and welfare’.  He authorized the 
identification of Essex County Council because its staff had ‘stoically borne a lot of 
undeserved and inaccurate criticism’. 
In 2013 the CoP, of its own motion, initiated a review of RGS’s care arrangements after 
he had been assaulted in his care home. RBS had continued to publish information about 
the case online in violation of reporting restrictions and s12 AJA.  Eldergill DJ held it 
‘highly unlikely’ that he could rely upon an absolute defence to enforcement 
proceedings.226  However, the ‘compassionate and long suffering’ local authority had not 
made a committal application, and Eldergill DJ continued to hold that ‘taking a punitive 
approach to someone who is unable to comply with litigation rules and directions would 
be unjust’.   
The Official Solicitor submitted that the court should seek to ensure that the publicity did 
not come to RGS’s attention and does not interfere with his care.  Eldergill DJ agreed 
with the latter point, but considered it unachievable for RGS not to be informed of the 
publicity by RBS.  RBS wished the court to identify him and RGS.  There was collective 
concern that he might not understand the potential implications of this, in particular that 
his conduct might be subject to adverse comment.  Eldergill DJ held that ‘RBS may make 
all the points he wishes, and may criticise the court and me publicly, including to the 
press, without being identified as the critic. Any advantage to him in being named is 
overwhelmed by the disadvantages to him and his health of being the subject of adverse 
public comment.’  The media made no application for wider lifting of reporting 
restrictions, but engaged in ‘a constructive and informative dialogue’ about the 
advantages and disadvantages of naming parties.  Eldergill DJ held that there was ‘good 
some facts are already 
in the public domain  
- Published reasons for 
approving a consent 
order 
- Identification of a local 
authority who had 
provided a very high 
level of service and 
been the subject of 
inaccurate criticism 
- Refusal to identify a 
protected party (other 
than P) who wishes to 
be identified, on the 
basis that they do not 
understand the 
potential adverse 
implications for 
themselves 
- Permission for local 
authority staff to 
identify themselves in 
the judgment to others 
in order to rebut unfair 
criticisms 
                                                          
225 He thanked Ms Canneti of The Independent and Mr Farmer of the Press Association in particular. 
226 Under the old M'Naghten Rules (Wookey v Wookey [1991] Fam 121; P v P (Contempt of Court: Mental Capacity) [1999] 2 FLR 892) 
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reason’ for considering permitting identification of all parties, but after conducting a 
balancing exercise concluded that the existing restrictions were appropriate.  Eldergill DJ 
also granted local authority staff permission to identify themselves to rebut unfair 
criticisms of their conduct by reference to judgments indicating that they had the 
support of the court.  He invited them to circulate the judgment to ‘irresponsible’ local 
newspapers which had breached reporting restrictions in the case and request removal 
of unauthorized content. 
Re AA [2012] EWHC 4378 
(COP) and P (A Child) 
[2013] EWCC B14 (Fam) 
 
Judges: Mostyn J (Re AA) 
and Munby P (P (A Child)) 
See also: P (A Child) [2013] 
EWCC B14 (Fam); Re P 
[2013] EWHC 4037 (Fam); 
Re P (A Child) (2013) 
EWHC 4383 (Fam) 
 
On 30th November 2013, Christopher Booker reported in the Telegraph that a pregnant 
Italian woman who was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 had been forcibly 
sedated and when she woke up her child had been delivered by caesarean section and 
removed from her care.227 In his original article228 Booker alleged that ‘Mr Justice 
Mostyn, had given the social workers permission to arrange for the child to be delivered’ 
and that ‘she was represented by lawyers assigned to her by the local authority’. The 
story received widespread critical coverage in the UK and worldwide media. The woman 
identified herself as Alessandra Pacchieri, and she – and her family – gave several media 
interviews giving their accounts of the case. At the time of publication, there was no 
transcript relating to the case in the public domain. 
A few days later, a county court judgment relating to the care of the baby appeared on 
BAILII. Shortly after that, a transcript of High Court proceedings before Mostyn J 
concerning Pacchieri’s mental capacity and best interests in relation to the birth of her 
child appeared on BAILII (Re AA). It transpired that an urgent application relating to the 
birth of her child had been brought by the NHS Trust, not the local authority, although 
Mostyn J gave guidance relating to the local authority’s plans for after the birth of the 
child. Pacchieri was represented by the Official Solicitor, who supported the NHS Trust’s 
application for delivery by caesarean, but who opposed the local authority’s plans for the 
involvement of police to remove the child from her care. Following release of the 
transcripts, the media eventually corrected earlier accounts that the local authority had 
applied for the operation. 
- Release of transcripts 
following adverse media 
coverage relating to a 
case in the CoP and the 
family courts. 
- The importance of 
publishing judgments to 
enable inaccurate media 
coverage to be 
corrected. 
- Rights of parties to ‘tell 
their story’ and 
competing rights of 
relatives to privacy 
- The purpose of 
reporting restrictions is 
not to exercise editorial 
control over media 
comment and criticism, 
nor to prevent 
defamation (where the 
                                                          
227 Booker, C. (2013) ''Operate on this mother so that we can take her baby’', The Telegraph, 30 November 2013. 
228 The article on the Telegraph website now appears to have been updated. 
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Essex County Council subsequently sought reporting restrictions (Re P (A Child)). In 
hearing the application,229 Munby P commented on inaccuracies in media coverage, but 
also stated ‘How can the family justice system blame the media for inaccuracy in the 
reporting of family cases if for whatever reason none of the relevant information has 
been put before the public?’ He held that the mother has an ‘obvious and compelling 
claim to be allowed to tell her story to the world’ and that ‘If ever there was a case in 
which that right should not be curtailed it is surely this case’. However, the child also had 
‘an equally compelling claim to privacy and anonymity’. He reiterated principles from Re 
J (A Child)230 that it is not the role of the judge to exercise editorial control over the 
content of media coverage; even if comment or criticism is ill informed, outspoken, 
crude, vulgar, or insulting, that is not in itself a basis for reporting restrictions by the CoP. 
Neither is it the role of the court to restrict the publication of comment that might be 
defamatory, as the remedy for that is an action in defamation not to the Family Division. 
He ordered that the name and address of the child and carers must remain confidential. 
Following this case, a relatively large number of CoP cases concerning matters relating to 
childbirth were published;231 it is unclear whether the media coverage prompted NHS 
bodies to seek court applications in matters where they hitherto had not, or whether 
they were simply more likely to be published as a result of the case and the new 
guidance. 
correct remedy is an 
action in defamation) 
Westminster City Council 
v Sykes [2014] EWHC B9 
(COP) 
Judge: Eldergill DJ 
Westminster CC applied to the CoP to determine whether it was in Manuela Sykes’ best 
interests to be deprived of her liberty in a care home against her strongly held wishes to 
the contrary. Eldergill DJ concluded that it was not, notwithstanding the risks of living at 
home, and authorised a trial period at home. 
Sykes had expressed a ‘strong wish’ for her situation to be reported and for her to be 
named. There was no assessment of her mental capacity to consent to this at the time of 
- Best interests decisions 
concerning publicity 
where ‘P’ seeks publicity 
and wishes to be 
identified 
                                                          
229 It seems the application was initially dealt with by Charles VP in Re P (A Child) (2013) EWHC 4383 (Fam), but there does not appear to be any transcript of this judgment 
available on the BAILII or Judiciary website. 
230 [2013] EWHC 2694 (Fam). 
231 Re P [2013] EWHC 4581 (COP); Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v AA & Ors (Rev 1) [2014] EWHC 132 (Fam); North Somerset Council v LW & Ors [2014] 
EWCOP 3; The Mental Health and the Acute Trust v DD & Anor [2014] EWCOP 8  
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the hearing. Following Eldergill DJ’s discussion with Ms Sykes, he notified the Press 
Association (PA) of the hearing, who produced an anonymised report. The PA then 
applied to identify Sykes.  
Eldergill DJ stated that not to allow an ‘incapacitated person’ privacy would amount to 
discrimination on grounds of mental illness or disability, but also recognised a public 
interest in hearings that determine their rights. He rejected arguments that if 
Westminster CC were named Sykes might be identifiable on the basis of the large size of 
the population, noting that most people are not ‘intent’ on identifying the person and in 
any case would be prohibited from publishing their identity. He also rejected argument 
that the transparency guidance did not apply to cases decided by district judges, on the 
basis that ‘the public interest and level of interference with a citizen's ordinary legal 
rights in a deprivation of liberty case is not less because it has been authorised by a 
district judge rather than a circuit judge’. He lifted reporting restrictions and permitted 
publication of an old photograph of her that was already in the public domain. Sykes’ 
personality was the ‘critical factor’, Eldergill DJ said: 
She has always wished to be heard. She would wish her life to end with a 
bang not a whimper. This is her last chance to exert a political influence 
which is recognisable as her influence. Her last contribution to the 
country's political scene and the workings and deliberations of the 
council and social services committee which she sat on. 
Eldergill DJ also commented in passing (as he had in RGS’ case) that a private court is not 
the same as being ‘secretive’: ‘a GP is not a ‘secret doctor’ because the press have no 
unqualified right to be present during patient consultations or to report what is said.’ 
- Publicity and 
identification of P as a 
political act by P 
- Realistic appraisal of risk 
of identification should 
the public authority be 
identified 
- Difference between a 
private court and a 
‘secret court’ 
Re Meek [2014] EWCOP 1 
Judge: HH Hodge J 
See also: Re GM, MJ & JM 
v The Public 
Guardian [2013] EWHC 
2966 
In an earlier decision, Lush SJ had refused an application by GM’s nieces for retrospective 
approval of gifts they had made to themselves from her estate totalling £231,259.50 (in 
addition to expenses of £46,552.24). Lush SJ discharged the deputies and ordered them 
to repay GM over £200,000. The new deputy sought to make a statutory will on behalf of 
GM benefitting two charities. 
A postscript to the judgment about the statutory will reports that GM died shortly 
afterwards. HH Hodge J sought representations from the parties on whether the 
judgment should be published. The panel deputy had no views either way. The Official 
- The CoP has jurisdiction 
to make an order 
authorising publication 
of a judgment of 
proceedings heard in 
private after the death 
of P. 
- It will not automatically 
follow from P’s death 
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Solicitor took the view that his role ceases upon the death of his client, but drew 
attention to the Article 8 rights of friends of GM involved in the case. It was 
acknowledged that this might be difficult for the discharged deputies, but observed that 
‘they would not be entitled to anonymity in any other form of equivalent civil recovery 
action’. It was accepted that the CoP has jurisdiction to authorise publication of the 
judgment after the death of the relevant person under rule 91(2)(b) as it may be made 
‘at any time’ (rule 93(1)(b)). It does not automatically follow from P’s death that it is 
appropriate to authorise a non-anonymised judgment, but ‘P’s death means that P no 
longer has any need for the special protection afforded by anonymity’. 
that a non-anonymised 
judgment should be 
published, but ‘P’s 
death means that P no 
longer has any need for 
the special protection 
afforded by anonymity’ 
Newcastle Upon Tyne 
Hospitals Foundation 
Trust v LM [2014] EWCOP 
6 
Judge: Jackson J 
See also: Newcastle Upon 
Tyne Hospitals Foundation 
Trust v LM [2014] EWCOP 
454 
The NHS Trust had sought a declaration that it was lawful to withhold a blood 
transfusion from LM, a 63 year old woman who was a Jehovah’s Witness. LM died 
shortly before the judgment was handed down. A question arose as to whether the CoP 
had jurisdiction to issue a reporting restriction when the subject of the proceedings has 
died before the making of the order232. Jackson J initially made an order ‘that preserves 
the situation until the time comes when someone seeks to present full argument on the 
question’ (EWCOP 454). 
The PA subsequently applied to lift restrictions on identifying LM. Jackson J observed 
that PD13A implied that reporting restrictions would not extend beyond the death of P 
unless the interests of others required it. Jackson J concluded that there was ‘no good 
reason to conclude that the person’s death should lead automatically to all protection 
being lost’. Therefore, where publication of information has been restricted during the 
person’s lifetime, the CoP must consider whether this protection should continue after 
their death. In LM’s particular case, however, the balance fell in favour of discharging the 
anonymity order. 
- Rights to anonymity for 
people who are the 
subject of CoP 
proceedings do not 
cease upon their death. 
- The CoP may make an 
order restricting 
reporting when the 
subject of that order has 
already died  
- The CoP must consider 
whether such an order 
should be made 
London Borough of 
Redbridge v G & Ors (No. 
2) [2014] EWHC 959 (COP) 
and G v London Borough 
G was a 94 year old woman with a diagnosis of dementia. Two individuals – C and F – 
moved into her home and provided ‘care’ for her. LB Redbridge received safeguarding 
referrals from a large number of independent sources - including a care provider, a 
solicitor, her neighbours, church, friends, family and police – concerned about witnessing 
- Capacity and best 
interests to consent to 
contact with the media 
where there is concern 
                                                          
232 As opposed to making an order whilst they are alive, which continues in effect after they have died, which the court can already make: Re C (Adult Patient: Restriction of 
Publicity After Death [1996] 1 FCR 605 
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of Redbridge, Associated 
Newspapers Limited and 
Others [2014] EWHC 1361 
and Re G (Adult) [2014] 
EWCOP 5  
Judges: Russell J, Cobb J 
and Munby P 
See also: London Borough 
of Redbridge v G & Ors 
[2014] EWHC 485 (COP) 
and London Borough of 
Redbridge v G & Ors 
[2014] EWHC 17 (COP) 
them shouting and screaming at her and her being frightened of them. They initiated 
proceedings in the CoP to prevent C and F from registering a Lasting Power of Attorney 
(LPA) that would place them in charge of her property and affairs, and seeking a capacity 
assessment and best interests declaration regarding whether C and F should live with 
her. When in the presence of C and F, G would state that she wished them to remain 
living with her, but in private she confided to a doctor and an independent social worker 
that she felt like a spider in a web, and she had told a neighbour that she wanted the 
government to intervene as she was being bullied. G believed, because C and F had told 
her, that if she asked them to leave she would be placed in a care home; the local 
authority stated they would ensure she was cared for in her own home. 
On 15 February 2014 Christopher Booker reported on the ‘the bizarre story of a frail but 
otherwise capable 94-year-old woman’ where social services aimed ‘to take control of 
her £350,000 home and her substantial savings, to transfer her against her will to a care 
home and then to evict from the house a niece and her husband who look after her’.233 
Booker described how his friend Ian Josephs had arranged for a capacity assessment by 
Dr Ludwig Lowenstein. The media attended the hearing on 26 February 2014 (EWHC 
485). Under cross-examination it transpired that Dr Lowenstein had no expertise in 
capacity assessment or dementia, had assessed G’s capacity in the presence of C and had 
not been given full information about the background to the case. 
In March, C took G on a public protest about her case. An off-duty police officer passing 
by at the time was concerned and found upon speaking to G that she wanted to go 
home, and noted that she was shaking. LB Redbridge subsequently applied for an order 
forbidding C from taking G on public protests, demonstrations or meetings with the 
press (London Borough of Redbridge v G & Ors (No. 2)). Cobb J heard evidence that G had 
expressed conflicting views to different people about whether she wanted the press 
involved in her case. The court concluded that it was in G’s best interests not to speak to 
the press pending a capacity assessment on this matter. The Daily Mail described this as 
that a person may be 
acting under undue 
influence 
- Restrictions on taking a 
person to talk to the 
media or protest about 
CoP proceedings 
- Application by the 
media to become a 
party to a CoP case 
(refused) 
- Costs orders are not to 
be used to punish 
inaccurate or critical 
reporting, but may be 
awarded against the 
media if it makes 
inappropriate 
applications to become 
a party in proceedings in 
which it has no 
legitimate interest 
-  
                                                          
233 Booker, C. (2014) 'Will this OAP be robbed of her house and money?', The Telegraph, 15 February 2014. 
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‘gagging’ Ms G234, subsequently alleging that G herself could face ‘face a prison sentence 
or stiff financial penalty’ if she spoke to the media.235 
In April the Official Solicitor wrote to Associated News Ltd (ANL) expressing concern at 
overheard plans for Sue Reid, a Daily Mail journalist, to have social contact with G. 
Munby P expressed the view that there was no proper basis for the contention that Reid 
could not do this. In a highly unusual move, ANL then applied to become a party to the 
case ([2014] EWCOP 1361), saying that it had a legitimate interest as the outcome of G’s 
capacity assessment would affect their ability to communicate with her, and that there 
was a strong public interest in allowing G to exercise her Article 8 and 10 rights to 
communicate with third parties. ANL expressed concern that without their involvement 
the Official Solicitor and other parties would not adequately explore these issues, and 
the instructions to the capacity assessor might be ‘weighted to lead Dr Barker to make 
an assessment that G lacks capacity’ to choose to speak with the media. Munby P 
rejected the argument that without ANL’s involvement there might not be full argument 
on these issues – stating that the CoP’s processes are inquisitorial rather than 
adversarial. He contended that if G is found to have capacity the CoP has no role in 
restricting contact with the media, and if she lacks capacity the CoP may stand in her 
shoes and make the decision on her behalf. If the CoP decides that she should not speak 
to the media, the media have no more right to dispute that than they would to dispute a 
capacitous person closing the door on a journalist. 
Following this decision, LB Redbridge and the Official Solicitor sought a costs order 
against ANL for their application to become a party to the case ([2014] EWCOP 5). The 
general rule for welfare proceedings is that each party should pay their own costs, and 
these proceedings were welfare proceedings.236 It was said that the court should depart 
from this rule as the application ‘was fundamentally misconceived. ANL failed on every 
part of its application’ and was ‘a fishing expedition for its own gain’.  They also 
complained that ANL’s conduct during the proceedings had ‘been far from exemplary’, 
                                                          
234 Reid, S. (2014) '94-year-old is gagged by secret court: Draconian order silences pensioner in row with council social workers', Daily Mail, 28 March 2014. 
235 Reid, S. (2014) 'Gagged by the secret courts: Spinster, 94, banned from speaking publicly about her legal battle with social workers after judge rules she's not mentally 
well enough', Daily Mail, 03 May 2014. 
236 Rule 157 Court of Protection Rules 2007 
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citing Cobb J’s criticisms of its reporting of the proceedings. ANL stated that the Official 
Solicitor did not need to instruct two counsel. Munby P was ‘troubled by the suggestion 
that ANL’s conduct during the proceedings should be visited in an adverse costs order’, 
saying that it might reflect a mindset that did not recognise the media’s vitally important 
role. Even if there could be criticism of the reporting, ‘Orders for costs are not to be 
made as a back-door method of punishing inaccurate or even tendentious reporting’, 
and such a suggestion could have a chilling effect. Holding that ANL had made an 
application to be joined to proceeding sin which it had no recognised interest, which was 
‘misconceived and which failed completely’, Munby P held that they should pay 30% of 
the costs of the Official Solicitor and the local authority. 
In a final hearing in the case ([2014] EWHC 17 (COP)), Russell J reported that in May all 
parties had agreed that G lacked mental capacity to make decisions about speaking to 
the media. She concluded that G lacked mental capacity to make decisions about 
whether or not C and F should live with her and was subject to their undue influence, 
being ‘almost paralysed with fear by the threats regarding her removal to a care-home’. 
In these circumstances it was hard to discern her true wishes and feelings, however – 
observing the importance to G of her home, and the longstanding importance to her of 
her friends and her church – she made an order that it was in G’s best interests not to 
live with C and F, for the LPA she made giving them control of her financial affairs to be 
revoked, for her to remain in her home with support from the local authority and be re-
integrated into her local church.  
Christopher Booker subsequently complained in The Telegraph that C had been 
portrayed ‘in a very unfavourable light’ in the judgment, that this decision was contrary 
to the findings of an ‘eminent psychologist’, that the litigation had been funded out of 
G’s savings and that now they were ‘all gone to pay the costs of the case, she must still 
be allowed to remain in her own home’ and ‘taxpayers must foot the bill’.237 
Public Guardian v JM (Rev 
1) [2014] EWCOP 7  
Judge: Munby P 
In Re DP Lush SJ revoked an LPA made by DP that appointed JM to manage her property 
and affairs because JM had contravened his authority and had not acted in DP’s best 
interests. JM had sold DP’s house and placed the proceeds in his own bank account, he 
 
                                                          
237 Booker, C. (2014) 'How the Court of Protection left a 94-year-old without savings or dignity', The Telegraph, 16 August 2014. 
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See also: Re DP 
(Revocation of Lasting 
Power of Attorney) [2014] 
EWCOP B4 
had attempted to transfer DP’s investment bonds into his own name, had ‘gifted’ himself 
£38,000 of DP’s money, was unable to account for £10,020 of her savings and had paid 
himself a salary of £8,340. 
Lush SJ had not named JM in his judgment. In an article, the Daily Mail criticized his 
decision not to name JM, saying that the ‘ruling wrongly protects the gardener and 
leaves other elderly and vulnerable people and their families without warning of his 
record’238. ANL applied for an order permitting the identification of JM. JM stated that he 
was being unfairly painted as a thief and being made a scapegoat by ANL. Munby P 
reiterated his comments in Re P (Enforced Caesarean: Reporting Restrictions), that 
remedies for defamation or unfair treatment by a newspaper lie elsewhere than the 
CoP. Munby P accepted ANL’s submission that the impact of identifying JM on DP was 
likely to be minimal, because of her state of health and because it was unlikely that 
anyone would identify her who could not already do so from the anonymised judgment. 
Regarding JM’s Article 8 rights, Munby P recognized the potential for identification to 
have ‘a very significant additional and unpleasant impact on him’. ANL countered that his 
rights to privacy were outweighed by the strong public interest in exposing his 
wrongdoing. Munby P agreed, and also commented ‘Why should JM be any more 
entitled to anonymity, just because the only judicial finding thus far has been made by 
the Court of Protection, than he would be if his self-same conduct was being considered 
in the Chancery Division or the Crown Court?’ At the end of the judgment, Munby P 
himself identified JM by name. The Daily Mail subsequently published an article about 
‘unmasking’ JM,239 although the story was not on their website at the time of writing or 
published elsewhere.240 
NHS Trust & Ors v FG (Rev 
1) [2014] EWCOP 30 
Judge: Keehan J 
Two NHS Trusts applied to the CoP seeking orders relating to the ante-natal care, and 
interventions relating to childbirth, of FG – a pregnant woman who was detained under 
the Mental Health Act 1983.  FG had paranoid thoughts and believed that medical 
professionals were conspiring to murder her.  The applications were made without 
- Reporting restriction 
granted to prevent the 
relevant person from 
learning about 
                                                          
238 Doughty, S. (2014) 'Handyman took £200,000 from woman, 89, after secret court gave him control of her bank account', Daily Mail, 17 March 2014. 
239 Sears, N. (2014) 'Unmasked, gardener who took £200k from pensioner and was shielded', Daily Mail, 7 July 2014. 
240 It is, however, still available on Nexis. 
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notice to FG, the Trusts contending that if she learned of the proceedings she would 
perceive them as part of a state conspiracy against her, that this in turn could further 
damage her relationship with those treating her, and increase her distress – increasing 
the likelihood of her impulsive acts during labour that might harm her or her baby.  Not 
telling FG about the proceedings was said to be an ‘exceptional step’ and ‘at the 
extremity of what is permissible under the European Convention.’ 
The Trust therefore applied for reporting restrictions, reasoning that if the case was in 
the public domain and the hospital were identified, other patients might identify FG and 
word would get back to her of the proceedings.  The court criticised their giving late 
notice to the media of this application.  Keehan J granted the reporting restrictions, but 
set a date for them to terminate with the parties at liberty to apply for them to be 
extended.  After FG gave birth (without complications or the need to use the orders), her 
doctor recommended that she be told about the proceedings.  The reporting restrictions 
were lifted and the judgment published, but the Trust was not to be identified because 
there was held to be a ‘real risk’ that FG could be identified because of the unusual 
circumstances of the case.  Keehan J was invited to give guidance to Trusts regarding use 
of the MCA relating to ante-natal care and childbirth in circumstances such as these.  In 
that guidance he reiterated that ‘If an application is made by either the Trusts or by the 
local authority for permission not to notify P of the application(s) and it is thought 
appropriate to apply for a Reporting Restrictions Order, the applicant(s) must give full 
and proper notice to the print and broadcast media of the same.’ 
proceedings which she 
had not been notified 
of; 
- A ‘step by step’ 
approach to reporting 
restrictions – subject to 
review of changing 
circumstances; 
- Restrictions on 
identifying an NHS Trust 
where there is a ‘real 
risk’ that the mother 
could be identified; 
- Guidance reminding 
NHS Trusts to give ‘full 
and proper notice’ to 
the media if they are 
making applications for 
permission not to notify 
the relevant person and 
seeking reporting 
restrictions 
A Local Authority v B & 
Ors [2014] EWCOP B21  
Judge: HH Cardinal J 
See also: Derbyshire 
County Council v Danby 
[2014] EWCOP B22; A 
Local Authority v B, F & G 
[2014] EWCOP B18; 
Derbyshire County Council 
Derbyshire County Council sought an order for the long term placement of a young 
woman with learning disabilities, B, and restrictions on contact with her father and 
paternal grandmother (but not her mother).  The CoP proceedings followed on from 
earlier public law family court proceedings.  At the time of the hearing, the father was 
already in contempt of court in relation to breaching earlier orders by meeting with B 
covertly.  He lived in Scotland, and did not attend court as there was a warrant for his 
arrest in England.  He disputed expert evidence that B lacked mental capacity but 
provided no evidence to support this claim.  The CoP made a Hadkinson order 
(Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567) which prevents a person who is in contempt 
of court from making further applications until they have purged their contempt.  In a 
later hearing, holding that B required a period of ‘peace’ from the litigation, he restricted 
- Committal application 
for breaching 
restrictions on contact 
with a family member; 
- Cross-border limitations 
in arrest warrants for 
contempt of court; 
- Hadkinson orders – 
preventing applications 
from those in contempt 
of court 
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v Danby [2014] EWCOP 
B26 
applications to vary the orders for a period of four years.  Anonymised judgments for 
these decisions were placed on BAILII. 
Subsequently the council applied for a committal order against B’s grandmother, 
Kathleen Danby, whom they alleged had breached orders prohibiting contact with her 
granddaughter.  CCTV footage recorded them meeting outside a pub near B’s care home.  
The court heard evidence that whenever B had contact with her father or paternal 
grandmother she became very distressed and unsettled, although she expressed a desire 
to see them.  Danby lived in Orkney and did not attend court for the committal 
application, although she was served notice of the application. HH Cardinal J sentenced 
Danby to three month’s imprisonment for contempt and issued a warrant for her arrest. 
The judgment named Danby and was placed on BAILII.  A second judgment on BAILII 
stated that the case was listed for a review, to reduce or mitigate the sentence, but that 
Danby had not availed herself of that opportunity.   
It was subsequently reported in the media that Danby had been arrested whilst 
attending a Ken Dodd concert in England, and that after two nights in prison she had 
attended court and purged her contempt.  The Daily Mail stated ‘Refused access to the 
Court of Protection, this paper has no idea whether or not there were good reasons for 
banning Mrs Danby from contacting her granddaughter’.241  At the time of writing, there 
is no judgment on BAILII concerning the hearing where Danby purged her contempt. 
                                                          
241 A Martin, 'Treated worse than a dog: Grandmother freed after three days in jail for a hug reveals how she was bruised by police officers; deprived of sleep and access to 
her lawyer and not allowed to take her liver pills', Daily Mail (London 31 December 2014) 
 67 
 
APPENDIX 3: COURT OF PROTECTION PRACTICE 
DIRECTION 13A – HEARINGS (INCLUDING REPORTING 
RESTRICTIONS) 
This practice direction supplements Part 13 of the Court of Protection Rules 2007, and was amended 
following The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2015 SI 2015/549 (L6).  It substitutes an earlier version 
of Practice Direction 13A 
General 
1. Hearings before the court will generally be in private but the court may order that the whole or part of 
any hearing is to be held in public. The court also has power to: 
(a) authorise the publication of information about a private hearing; 
(b) authorise persons to attend a private hearing; 
(c) exclude persons from attending either a private or public hearing; or 
(d) restrict or prohibit the publication of information about a private or public hearing. 
2. Part 1 of this practice direction applies to any application for an order under rules 90 to 92. 
3. Part 2 of the practice direction makes additional provision in relation to orders founded on Convention 
rights which would restrict the publication of information. 
(Section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 defines “the Convention rights”.) 
PART 1 
Applications under rules 90, 91 or 92 
4. An application for an order under rule 90, 91 or 92 must be commenced by filing an application notice 
form using COP9 in accordance with Part 10. 
5. For the purposes of rules 90 to 92, a statement of truth in an application notice may be made by a person 
who is not a party. 
6. For an application commenced under rules 90, 91 or 92, the court should consider whether to direct that 
the application should be dealt with as a discrete issue. 
PART 2 
Powers of the court to impose reporting restrictions 
Court sitting in private 
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7. Section 12(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 provides that, in any proceedings brought under 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 before a court which is sitting in private, publication of information about the 
proceedings will generally be contempt of court. However, rule 91(1) makes it clear that there will be no 
contempt where the court has authorised the publication of the information under rule 91 or the publication 
is authorised in accordance with Part 3 of this Practice Direction. Where the court makes an order 
authorising publication, it may (at the same time or subsequently) restrict or prohibit the publication of 
information relating to a person’s identity. Such restrictions may be imposed either on an application made 
by any person (usually a party to the proceedings) or of the court’s own initiative. 
8. The general rule is that hearings will be in private and that there can be no lawful publication of 
information unless the court has authorised it or the publication is authorised in accordance with Part 3 of 
this Practice Direction. Where reporting restrictions are imposed as part of the order authorising publication, 
they will simply set out what can be published and there will be no need to comply with the requirements as 
to notice which are set out in Part 2 of this practice direction. But if the restrictions are subsequent to the 
order authorising publication, then the requirements of Part 2 should be complied with. 
Court sitting in public 
9. Where a hearing is to be held in public as a result of a court order under rule 92, the court may restrict or 
prohibit the publication of information about the proceedings. Such restrictions may be imposed either on 
an application made by any person (usually a party to the proceedings) or of the court’s own initiative. 
Notification in relation to reporting restrictions 
10. In connection with the imposition of reporting restrictions, attention is drawn to section 12(2) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. This means that where an application has been made for an order restricting the 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression, the order must not be made where the person against whom 
the application is made is neither present nor represented unless the court is satisfied— 
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or 
(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. 
11. The need to ensure that P’s Convention rights are protected may be at issue when the court is 
considering whether to make an order that a public hearing should be held. Part 2 of this practice direction 
should therefore be complied with where the court is considering making an order under rule 92(2) of its 
own initiative. 
12. In summary, the requirements to notify in accordance with the requirements of Part 2 of this practice 
direction will apply in any case where— 
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(a) the court has made an order for the publication of information about proceedings which are 
conducted in private and, after the order has been made: 
(i) an application founded on P’s Convention rights is made to the court for an order under 
rule 91(3) which would impose restrictions (or further restrictions) on the information that 
may be published, or 
(ii) of its own initiative, the court is considering whether to impose such restrictions on the 
basis of P’s Convention rights; or 
(b) the court has already made an order for a hearing to be held in public and: 
(i) an application founded on Convention rights is made to the court for an order under rule 
92(2) which would impose restrictions (or further restrictions) on the information that may 
be published, or 
(ii) of its own initiative, the court is considering whether to vary or impose further such 
restrictions. 
Notice of reporting restrictions to be given to national news media 
13. Notice of the possibility that reporting restrictions may be imposed can be effected via the Press 
Association’s CopyDirect service, to which national newspapers and broadcasters subscribe as a means of 
receiving notice of such applications. Such service should be the norm. The court retains the power to make 
orders without notice (whether in response to an application or of its own initiative) but such cases will be 
exceptional. 
14. CopyDirect will be responsible for notifying the individual media organisations. Where the order would 
affect the world at large this is sufficient service for the purposes of advance notice. The website: 
http://www.medialawyer.press.net/courtapplications gives details of the organisations represented and 
instructions for service of the application. 
Notice of an application to be given by applicant 
15. A person who has made an application founded on Convention rights should give advance notice of the 
application to the national media via the Press Association’s CopyDirect service. He should first telephone 
CopyDirect (tel. no 0870 837 6429). Unless an order pursuant to rule 19 has been made, a copy of the 
following documents should be sent either by fax (fax no 0870 830 6949) or to the e-mail address provided 
by CopyDirect— 
(a) the application form or application notice seeking the restriction order; 
(b) the witness statement filed in support; 
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(c) any legal submissions in support; and 
(d) an explanatory note setting out the nature of the proceedings in the form set out in the Annex to 
this practice direction. 
16. It is helpful if applications are accompanied by an explanatory note from which persons served can 
readily understand the nature of the case (though care should be taken that the information does not 
breach any rule or order of the court in relation to the use or publication of information). In any case where 
notice of an application has not been given, the explanatory note should explain why. 
17. Unless there is a particular reason not to do so, copies of all the documents referred to above should be 
served. If there is a reason for not serving some or all of the documents (or parts of them), the applicant 
should ensure sufficient detail is given to enable the media to make an informed decision as to whether it 
wishes to attend a hearing or be legally represented. 
18. The CopyDirect service does not extend to local or regional media or magazines. If service of the 
application on any specific organisation or person not covered is required, it should be effected directly. 
19. The court may dispense with any of the requirements set out in paragraphs 15 to 18. 
 
Notice of own-initiative order to be given by court 
20. In any case where the court gives advance notice of an own-initiative order to the national media, it will 
send such of the information listed in paragraph 15 as it considers necessary. 
 
Responding to a notice 
21. Where a media organisation or any other person has been notified of an application or own-initiative 
order, they may decide that they wish to participate in any hearing to determine whether reporting 
restrictions should be imposed. In order to take part, the person must file an acknowledgment of service 
(“the acknowledgment”) using form COP5 within 14 days beginning with the date on which the notice of the 
reporting restrictions was given to him by CopyDirect. 
22. The acknowledgment must be filed in accordance with rule 75. 
23. A person who has filed an acknowledgment will not become a party to the substantive proceedings (ie. 
the proceedings in relation to which an application form was filed) except to such extent (if any) as the court 
may direct. 
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The hearing 
24. Any application or own-initiative order which invokes Convention rights will involve a balancing of rights 
under Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 10 (freedom of expression). There is 
no automatic precedence as between these Articles, and both are subject to qualification where (among 
other considerations) the rights of others are engaged. 
25. In the case of an application, section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires the court to have 
particular regard to the importance of freedom of expression. It must also have regard to the extent to 
which material has or is about to become available to the public, the extent of the public interest in such 
material being published and the terms of any relevant privacy code (such as the Editor’s Code of Practice 
enforced by the Independent Press Standards Organisation). 
26. The same approach will be taken where the court is considering an own-initiative order imposing 
reporting restrictions. 
 
Scope of order 
Persons protected 
27. The aim should be to protect P rather than to confer anonymity on other individuals or organisations. 
However, the order may include restrictions on identifying or approaching specified family members, carers, 
doctors or organisations or other persons as the court directs in cases where the absence of such restriction 
is likely to prejudice their ability to care for P, or where identification of such persons might lead to 
identification of P and defeat the purpose of the order. In cases where the court receives expert evidence 
the identity of the experts (as opposed to treating clinicians) is not normally subject to restriction, unless 
evidence in support is provided for such a restriction.  
Information already in the public domain 
28. Orders will not usually be made prohibiting publication of material which is already in the public domain, 
other than in exceptional cases. 
Duration of order 
29. Orders should last for no longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which they are made. The 
order may need to last until P’s death. In some cases a later date may be necessary, for example to maintain 
the anonymity of doctors or carers after the death of a patient. 
 
PART 3: COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION RELATING TO PROCEEDINGS HELD IN PRIVATE 
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Introduction 
30. Rule 91 deals with the communication of information (whether or not contained in a document filed 
with the court) relating to proceedings in the Court of Protection which are held in private. 
31. Subject to any direction of the court, information may be communicated for the purposes of the law 
relating to contempt in accordance with paragraphs  33 to 37. 
32. Nothing in this Part of this Practice Direction permits the communication to the public at large or any 
section of the public of any information relating to the proceedings. 
 
Communication of information – general  
33. Information may be communicated where the communication is to— 
(a) a party; 
(b) the legal representative of a party; 
(c) an accredited legal representative or a representative within the meaning of rule 3A;  
(d) a professional legal adviser;  
(e) the Director of Legal Aid Casework; 
(f) an expert whose instruction by a party has been authorised by the court for the purposes of the 
proceedings; 
(g) any person instructed to make a report under section 49 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005; 
(h) the Official Solicitor (prior to the Official Solicitor becoming a litigation friend); 
(i) the Public Guardian. 
 
Communication of information for purposes connected with the proceedings  
34. (1) A party or the legal representative of a party, on behalf of and upon the instructions of that 
party, may communicate information relating to the proceedings to any person where necessary to enable 
that party— 
(a)  by confidential discussion, to obtain support, advice or assistance in the conduct of the 
proceedings; 
(b)  to engage in mediation or other forms of non-court dispute resolution; 
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(c)  to make and pursue a complaint against a person or body concerned in the proceedings; or 
(d)  to make and pursue a complaint regarding the law, policy or procedure relating to proceedings 
in the Court of Protection. 
(2) Where information is communicated to any person in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(a), no further 
communication by that person is permitted. 
(3) When information relating to the proceedings is communicated to any person in accordance with sub-
paragraphs (1)(b),(c) or (d)— 
(a) the recipient may communicate that information to a further recipient, provided that – 
(i) the party who initially communicated the information consents to that further 
communication; and 
(ii) the further communication is made only for the purpose or purposes for which the party 
made the initial communication; and 
(b) the information may be successively communicated to and by further recipients on as many 
occasions as may be necessary to fulfil the purpose for which the information was initially 
communicated, provided that on each such occasion the conditions in sub-paragraph (a) are met. 
 
Communication of information by a party etc. for other purposes 
35. A person specified in the first column of the following table may communicate to a person listed in 
the second column such information as is specified in the third column for the purpose or purposes specified 
in the fourth column – 
A party A lay adviser, a McKenzie 
Friend, or a person 
arranging or providing pro 
bono legal services 
Any information 
relating to the 
proceedings 
To enable the party to 
obtain advice or 
assistance in relation to 
the proceedings 
A party A health care professional 
or a person or body 
providing counselling 
services for persons lacking 
capacity or their families 
To enable the party or a 
member of the party’s 
family to obtain health 
care or counselling 
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A party The European Court of 
Human Rights 
 For the purpose of making 
an application to the 
European Court of Human 
Rights 
A party, any person 
lawfully in receipt of 
information or a 
court officer 
A person or body 
conducting an approved 
research project 
 For the purpose of an 
approved research project 
A legal 
representative or a 
professional legal 
adviser, and the 
Public Guardian 
A person or body 
responsible for 
investigating or 
determining complaints in 
relation to legal 
representatives or 
professional legal advisers 
 For the purposes of the 
investigation or 
determination of a 
complaint in relation to a 
legal representative or a 
professional legal adviser 
A legal 
representative or a 
professional legal 
adviser 
A person or body assessing 
quality assurance systems 
 To enable the legal 
representative or 
professional legal adviser 
to obtain a quality 
assurance assessment 
A legal 
representative or a 
professional legal 
adviser 
An accreditation body Any information 
relating to the 
proceedings providing 
that it does not, or is 
not likely to, identify 
any person involved in 
the proceedings 
To enable the legal 
representative or 
professional legal adviser 
to obtain accreditation 
A party, or the 
Public Guardian 
A police officer The text or summary of 
the whole or part of a 
For the purpose of a 
criminal investigation 
 75 
 
judgment given in the 
proceedings 
A party or any 
person lawfully in 
receipt of 
information 
A member of the Crown 
Prosecution Service 
 To enable the Crown 
Prosecution Service to 
discharge its functions 
under any enactment 
 
Communication to and by Ministers of the Crown and Welsh Ministers 
36. A person specified in the first column of the following table may communicate to a person listed in 
the second column such information as is specified in the third column for the purpose or purposes specified 
in the fourth column – 
 
A party or any 
person lawfully in 
receipt of 
information 
relating to the 
proceedings 
A Minister of the Crown with 
responsibility for a 
government department 
engaged, or potentially 
engaged, in an application 
before the European Court of 
Human Rights relating to the 
proceedings 
Any information 
relating to the 
proceedings of 
which he or she is 
in lawful 
possession 
To provide the department 
with information relevant, or 
potentially relevant, to the 
proceedings before the 
European Court of Human 
Rights 
A Minister of the 
Crown 
The European Court of 
Human Rights 
For the purpose of 
engagement in an application 
before the European Court of 
Human Rights relating to the 
proceedings 
A Minister of the 
Crown 
Lawyers advising or 
representing the United 
Kingdom in an application 
before the European Court of 
For the purpose of receiving 
advice or for effective 
representation in relation to 
the application before the 
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Human Rights relating to the 
proceedings 
European Court of Human 
Rights 
A Minister of the 
Crown or a Welsh 
Minister 
Another Minister, or 
Ministers, of the Crown or a 
Welsh Minister 
For the purpose of 
notification, discussion and 
the giving or receiving of 
advice regarding issues raised 
by the information in which 
the relevant departments 
have, or may have, an interest 
 
37. (1)  This paragraph applies to communications made in accordance with paragraphs 35 and 36 and 
the reference in this paragraph to ‘the table’ means the table in the relevant paragraph. 
(2)  A person in the second column of the table may only communicate information relating to the 
proceedings received from a person in the first column for the purpose or purposes – 
(a) for which he or she received that information;  
(b) of professional development or training, providing that any communication does not, or is not 
likely to, identify any person involved in the proceedings without that person's consent; or 
(c) of fulfilling a statutory process. 
 
38. In this Practice Direction – 
‘accreditation body’ means – 
(a) The Law Society, or 
(b)  the Lord Chancellor in exercise of the Lord Chancellor's functions in relation to legal aid; 
‘approved research project’ means a project of research- 
(a) approved in writing by a Secretary of State after consultation with the President of the Court of 
Protection, or 
(b) approved in writing by the President of the Court of Protection. 
‘body assessing quality assurance systems’ includes – 
(a) The Law Society, 
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(b)  the Lord Chancellor in exercise of the Lord Chancellor's functions in relation to legal aid, or 
(c) The General Council of the Bar; 
‘body or person responsible for investigating or determining complaints in relation to legal representatives 
or professional legal advisers’ means – 
(a) The Law Society, 
(b) The General Council of the Bar, 
(c) The Institute of Legal Executives, 
(d) The Legal Services Ombudsman; or 
(e) The Office of Legal Complaints. 
‘criminal investigation’ means an investigation conducted by police officers with a view to it being 
ascertained – 
(a) whether a person should be charged with an offence, or 
(b) whether a person charged with an offence is guilty of it; 
‘health care professional’ means – 
(a) a registered medical practitioner, 
(b) a registered nurse or midwife, or 
(c) a clinical psychologist. 
‘lay adviser’ means a non-professional person who gives lay advice on behalf of an organisation in the lay 
advice sector; 
‘McKenzie Friend’ means any person permitted by the court to sit beside an unrepresented litigant in court 
to assist that litigant by prompting, taking notes and giving advice. 
 
ANNEX 
Application for a Reporting Restriction Order 
EXPLANATORY NOTE 
1 AB is in a permanent vegetative state. An application has been made by the NHS Hospital Trust responsible 
for his care for the Court of Protection to make a decision on the question of withdrawing artificial nutrition 
and hydration. This course is supported by AB's family. 
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2 On [date] the application will be heard by the Court of Protection [in public]. 
3 A Reporting Restriction Order has been [made/applied for] to protect AB's right to confidentiality in 
respect of his medical treatment. This does not restrict publication of information or discussion about the 
treatment of patients in a permanent vegetative state, provided that such publication is not likely to lead to 
the identification of AB, those caring for him, the NHS Trust concerned or the establishment at which he is 
being cared for.” 
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